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How does the military learn in disaster relief operations? The American military has long 
played a critical role in international responses to natural disasters. Its forward-deployed 
resources, manpower, and other unique capabilities make it a critical asset for the larger disaster 
relief community. While the U.S. military and scholars alike have poured considerable resources 
into understanding how the military learns in traditional operations, this literature fails to provide 
a compelling explanation for how and why the military learns in non-combat operations. 
Interviews with involved officials and primary source evidence of learning suggests that the 
military is better at learning in these operations than the current literature would predict. This 
project relies heavily on interviews with military and civilian personnel, military after action 
reviews, and authoritative secondary sources. The current literature on military learning predicts 
low levels of learning to occur in non-combat operations. Nevertheless, the U.S. military in the 
Asia Pacific has consistently learned from disaster relief operations and has, in fact, significantly 
improved its formal and informal processes of learning during these operations. To put it simply, 
the military has actively improved its capacity to learn how to learn. This finding upends the 
current literature on military learning and calls for a reevaluation of the potential value of 
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On March 20, 2003 the United States invaded Iraq, effectively seizing Baghdad and 
toppling Saddam Hussein’s government. By the end of that year, the American military mission 
in Iraq was failing. Insurgents had successfully driven out the United Nations, the international 
staff of the Red Cross, and other aid groups from the country, successful isolating American and 
Iraqi partner forces.  American troops were dying every day in clever insurgent attacks, as the 1
mightiest military in the world suffered at the hands of an enemy it could not find and could not 
understand. Simply put, the U.S. had started a war it didn’t know how to win.  
Belatedly and after numerous setbacks, the U.S. Army and Department of Defense 
recognized their deficiencies and went to the Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center to 
produce a working Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-07.22). After edits and a rewrite led 
by General David Petraeus, this working field manual emerged as the now-famous Field Manual 
3-24. Designed by a motley crew of military professionals, academics, media experts, and NGO 
workers, FM 3-24 served as a guide for the military’s operations in Iraq and represented a 
paradigm shift from a more traditional style of warfare to a Mao-esque “hearts and minds” 
campaign. It was implemented in 2006-2007 in the famous “surge” of American troops in Iraq. 
Ten years later, it remains unclear whether the lessons embodied by FM 3-24 propelled 
the American mission in Iraq to success. However, it is clear that the military, as an institution, 
began and completed a learning process. ​After experiencing failure, the military modified its 
approach to the conflicts in Iraq through a number of doctrinal, institutional, and changes. With 
the ever-increasing body count as a constant and grim point of pressure, the Army incorporated 
1Philip Gourevitch, “Winning and Losing,” ​The New Yorker,​ 12 December 2003  
5 
 change throughout its ranks because, in the chaos of post-Saddam Iraq, it was adapt or die. The 
story of FM 3-24 is a classic case of military learning, and one that exemplifies our traditional 
understanding of why militaries change. 
 
While the story of FM 3-24 is a well-known and remarkably successful example of 
learning, we should not have expected anything less. Based on the literature of 
military/bureaucratic learning, the conflict in Iraq should have produced a high degree of military 
learning. Generally, scholars point to several factors that spur such learning; geopolitical threat, 
failure in war, and lethal pressures are listed among them. In Iraq, Americans and allies were 
dying. The insurgency threatened to undermine all American efforts, and the military was failing 
to respond. The process that produced FM 3-24 both exemplifies and reinforces how the military 
leverages learning as a tool of war.  
Armed conflicts and wars are not the only areas in which the military can deploy such 
learning. The American military has recently played a critical role in responses to international 
natural disasters. Its forward-deployed resources, manpower, and other unique capabilities make 
it a critical asset for the larger disaster relief community. Since the first international disaster 
relief operation it coordinated in the Indian Ocean in 2004, the U.S. military has responded to 
about one to two international disasters per year. These operations are usually entirely absent of 
violence and therefore fall outside of the military’s core mission of fighting and winning the 
nation’s wars. Such non-core missions are not a priority for the American military.  Additionally, 
the pressures that traditionally drive military learning, according to the literature, are not there. 
Thus, disaster relief operations present a difficult test for the military’s learning process. 
6 
 Even absent the established drivers of military learning, does such learning take place in 
these operations? According to the traditional literature, the answer should be no. However, this 
thesis provides evidence to the contrary. The military has in fact learned from these disasters and 
it has incorporated these lessons from operations into changes in institutions, doctrine, and 
practice. It has produced and updated new doctrine on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations; assimilated disaster relief into multinational training exercises; invested in a research 
center aimed at improving disaster responses; and improved its execution in responses over time. 
These changes are indicators of learning. Such indicators beg a different question: why did the 
military learn at all?  That is, why did the military learn in a situation without the traditional 
incentives for learning? Secondly, what is the nature of this learning and what does its 
characteristics tell us about the breadth, depth, and durability of this learning?  
In exploring and answering these questions, this paper addresses a significant gap in the 
literature on military learning. While much has been written about how the military learns as a 
tool of war, few authors have addressed the military’s capacity for learning in the context of 
peaceful operations conducted for peaceful ends. Since 2004, the U.S. military has made these 
peaceful operations, particularly in the Asia Pacific and Central Asia regions, regular practice. 
From Indonesia to Japan to Nepal, the military has coordinated disaster relief and attempted to 
foster learning in this inorganic operating environment. This operational data has never before 
been analyzed through the lenses of learning, and yet it provides invaluable insight into both why 





 Chapter I 
Conceptualizing Military Learning 
 
Definition of Learning 
 
What is learning? I define learning as the 
deliberate incorporation of experience into new 
organizational and individual practices and 
procedures.  Learning is a type of change, but it is 2
not merely change. Change may or may not be 
intentional and may occur naturally over time. 
Learning, on the other hand, is deliberate and 
active. As learning scholar Levy writes, “actors 
actively search for the information they believe is 
necessary for a valid interpretation of historical 
experience.”   3
So what is ​military​ learning? Previous scholarship generally parses military learning into 
three overlapping categories-- adaptation, innovation, and organizational change. Generally, 
adaptation refers to low-level, tactical changes made within an iteration, operation, or war 
(Russell 2010; Gray 2006). An example of adaptation is the military’s use of metal detectors and 
development of the Mine Resistant-Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle after losing a number of 
soldiers to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq. Innovation typically refers to 
technological changes, such as the development of new weapons systems. Organizational change 
2 This definition shares a number of characteristics with that of Levy (1994), particularly in its attention to 
experience as a basis of learning.  
3 ​Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” ​International Organization​, Vol. 
48, No. 2. (Spring,1994), 283  
8 
 involves the incorporation of lessons into major institutional changes, and is often identified by 
changes in doctrine (Grissom 2006; Posen 1986; Avant 1993). My definition and indicators of 
learning are largely derived from these organizational theories. As have scholars before me, I use 
changes in doctrine and institutions as an indicator of learning. However, I add one additional 
indicator of learning, which I have labeled ‘changes in practice’. 
In theory, changes in doctrine, institutions, and training should effect changes in practice. 
Changes in practice may also emerge as a direct consequence of experience. For example, when 
the commander of a disaster relief operation decides to establish a civil-military coordination 
cell, she may do so because of doctrine or because of her own personal experiences.  In sum, 4
learning is the incorporation of lessons into training and doctrine that effectuates changes in 
practice.   5
 
Literature Review 
A robust literature examines how militaries adapt, innovate, and change. While this 
literature does not substantially address how the military learns in operations other than war, it 
effectively establishes the forces that drive successful military learning. This literature falls 
loosely into three overlapping perspectives: geopolitical (Posen 1986;Rosen 1991; Zisk 1993; 
Kier 1995, Farrell 2013), bureaucratic (Allison 1971; Halperin 2006; Russell 2010;), and a 
personality and leadership perspective (Nagl 2002; Ricks 2009; Avant 2010). It is important to 
note that these categories are largely implicit, as few social scientists approach military learning 
from one perspective at the exclusion of others. It is likewise important to emphasize that 
4 Grissom, Adam. “The Future of Military Innovations,” ​Journal of Strategic Studies​. Vol. 29 , Iss. 5. 2006 
5 To be clear, much of this definition is derived from that of previous scholarship, but I state explicitly what many of 
these scholars assume will happen with changes in doctrine and institutions: changes in practice.  
9 
 scholars within each category, while they agree on the structural dynamics that catalyze learning, 
can disagree on the proximate cause of that learning. For example,  some attribute learning to 
civilian policymakers, while others attribute it to military strategists. In this literature review, I 
will explain each of these perspectives and drivers of change. 
 
The Realists  
Scholars of the international political system argue that geopolitical pressures are crucial 
to successful military learning (Zisk 1993; Posen 1986; Farrell 2013).  For the sake of simplicity, 
I will call these scholars ‘the realists’ because they assume that military learning is intimately 
linked to a state’s pursuit of power. At its most basic level, the geopolitical approach assumes 
that the military is sensitive to the strategic pressures of its operating environments and will 
adjust its doctrines, institutions, and practices accordingly.  In practice, this might resemble the 6
following situation: the American military notices near-peer Russia building up its capacity for 
hybrid warfare. Fearing risk, defeat in war, annihilation, or the loss of future deterrence capacity, 
the American military responds by pushing for doctrinal, institutional, and practical changes in 
preparation for hybrid warfare. In this situation, learning was compelled by changes in the threat 
landscape.  
While realists largely agree that strategic pressures within the operating environment are 
the structural forces behind military learning, they disagree over the proximate causes of it. 
These disagreements can be separated into several categories based on how responsive each 
theorist believes the military is to the international system. In the first category, theorists 
6 Kimberly Marten Zisk. ​Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Intervention​ 1955-1991. ​Princeton 
University Press​. 1993; Theo Farrell et al., “Introduction: Military Adaptation in War”.  Military Adaptation in 
Afghanistan. ​Stanford University Press​. 2013 
10 
 Kimberly Zisk and Theo Farrell argue that the military is sensitive to the international system 
and will respond directly to its changes.  Zisk has argued that military policymakers are not only 7
bureaucratic entities, but state actors trying to pursue national security.  In this way, the military 8
brass is directly impacted by security threats. The Russia scenario described above most closely 
resembles a Ziskian world. Russia, through its pursuit of hybrid warfare, now presents greater 
risk to national security, prompting the military to respond in kind. Farrell’s perspective is 
broader than Zisk’s. He claims that a number of factors in the international system may induce 
military learning, including changes in alliance structures, international norms, and domestic 
cultures.  Farrell argues the military is attuned to all happenings on the international arena, not 9
just security threats.  
In the second category, theorists Barry Posen and Deborah Avant argue that the forces of 
the international system can only indirectly impact the military. Rather, the international system 
affects civilian policymakers, who then impress changes upon the military. Thus, the civilian 
policymaker is the actor most directly attuned to changes in the international system and must be 
the change agent acting upon the military.  Thus, it is the civilian leaders who most saliently feel 10
the pressures that push them to intervene and drive military doctrine forward. For Posen, who is 
writing in the context of great powers wars, these civilian leaders are preparing for high intensity 
conflict. Deborah Avant offers a similar process with a different ending: yes, the civilians are the 
7 Zisk’s argument here is quite similar to Posen’s in Sources of Military Doctrine, except that for Posen, the civilian 
strategist feels the pressure of the international system rather than the military brass. Thus, Posen does not see the 
military as capable of reform without pressures from civilian policymakers.  
8 ​Deborah Avant on Kimberly Zisk, ​Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univesity, 1994), 14-15 
9 ​Theo Farrell et al., “Introduction: Military Adaptation in War”.  Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. ​Stanford 
University Press​. 2013 
10 In contrast to Zisk, who largely ignores the civilian 3rd actor.  
11 
 ones who act as change agents for the military, but their efforts to instigate change are often 
undermined by the military itself. She cites civil-military relations under President Kennedy to 
illustrate this point, describing how Kennedy’s efforts to micromanage doctrinal change in 
Vietnam were “undermined by Army personnel.”   11
Some realist theories refine prior models of military learning by highlighting how 
learning varies across organizations within the military, rather than viewing the military as a 
“monolith.”  Each component of the military will face differing bureaucratic incentives and 12
foster a unique culture, and therefore, the circumstances under which they learn and the amount 
of learning ought to vary. In underscoring these distinctions, Rosen proposes a number of ideas, 
including that individual components will vary in their sensitivity to threats and their ability to 
innovate when problems fall “outside of the parameters of established missions of concepts of 
operation.”  For instance, the Air Force is more likely to learn in a heavy Air Power campaign 13
than is the Army, just as the Navy is most likely to feel the pressure of Chinese aggression on the 
South China Seas.  
However, these distinctions largely do not apply in Human Assistance/Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR) because no component claims these operations within its organizational purpose. 
Additionally, there are no monetary or ideological incentives for components to make HA/DR 
part of their organizational purpose. There is no budget specifically designated for HA/DR, and 
HA/DR frequently competes with components’ original missions. In fact, components are 
actively disincentivized from pursuing HA/DR. Thus, among components with the equal HA/DR 
11 Avant 1994, 405 
12 ​Stephen Peter Rosen, ​Winning the Next War:Innovation and the Modern Military​ (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); 18 
13 ​Ibid. 34  
12 
 exposure, we would expect to see little variance in HA/DR learning. As components experience 
increased HA/DR exposure, we could logically predict higher amounts of learning. For example, 
we might expect a slightly higher degree of learning in the Marines than in other services 
because they are routinely called on to lead and execute HA/DR.  
In sum, realists believe that the military learns when pushed by forces of the international 
system. These forces could be a security threat, international norm, or interstate competition. 
While these explanations are compelling, they falter when applied to disaster relief operations. 
These theories do not address how a military might learn when it is not used as a tool of war. 
Indeed, by assuming that international threats are the only catalyst of military learning, none of 
these theories can sufficiently explain how the military might behave when it is not preparing for 
armed conflict. In disaster relief operations, the threat of defeat and annihilation is absent at a 
number of levels-- soldiers are not afraid of losing their lives in battle, and the stakes are 
relatively low, operationally. There are no battles and no campaigns to lose in a disaster relief 
operation. And likewise, at the strategic level, there is no overarching war to lose, and little 
interstate competition regarding disaster relief operations.  
This is not to say that there are not strategic interests in conducting disaster relief 
operations. Certainly disaster relief in the Asia Pacific falls under a broader grand strategy of 
engagement with the region. Similar levels of engagement can be produced by bilateral and 
multilateral training exercises, a cheaper and much more conventional option. However, these 
factors are largely removed from the operations and development of operational knowledge 
regarding disaster relief as a whole. Moreover, these theories imply there is not only an absence 
of incentive, but a disincentive for learning. These operations do not occur in a vacuum; they are 
13 
 conducted alongside the training and execution for combat operations and thus distract from the 
military’s core mission to fight and win the nation’s wars. If forces from 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Force are focused on a disaster response, they are not available for quick 
deployment. As long as training is focused on conducting disaster relief responses, it is not 
focused on preparing for war.   14
The central question of this thesis is how the military learns in disaster relief operations. 
In this way, we are not merely interested in the military as a tool of war, but rather as an 
exceptionally robust bureaucratic organization with unique capabilities. Thus, these 
realpolitik​-oriented theories are most useful in helping us understand why we ought to have low 
expectations for how much the military should learn at these operations. However, while the 
international system might provide some insight on how the military learns, these realist theories 
do not provide an exhaustive explanation for military learning in disaster relief operations.  
 
The Bureaucrats  
In contrast to the ​realpolitik​-oriented approaches, some scholars point to bureaucratic or 
institutional politics to explain how, when, and why a military bureaucracy may or may not 
learn. In general, organizational theorists see military organizations as resistant to change 
(Allison 1999) (Halperin 1974). This model implies that, as learning theorist Janine Davidson 
notes, “even when various actors within a military organization desire a change...structural 
mechanisms would likely mitigate against it.”   15
14 To be clear, this is not to say that training is entirely siloed, that training for one operation does not have value in 
another operation. However, in general, training to fight looks different than training to deliver goods, recover 
bodies, repair homes, etc.  
15 Janine Davidson ​Lifting the Fog of Peace: how Americans learned to fight modern war​, University of Michigan 
Press: 2010, 11  
14 
 But clearly organizations do learn. As a result,  three questions for bureaucratic theorists 
emerge: 1) Under what conditions might a bureaucratic organization change? 2) What are the 
driving forces behind this change? 3) What might this change look like? One answer could be the 
bureaucratic agency’s own desire to prove its importance as well as seek independence from the 
larger bureaucratic  regime.  Halperin articulates this dynamic, writing that bureaucratic officials 16
“attach very high priority to controlling their own resources so that these can be used to support 
the essence of the organization.”  17
For instance, the Air Force ought to 
be quick to innovate a 
drone-centric counterinsurgency 
strategy because the Air Force sees 
itself as the primary provider of air 
power in the American military. By 
working to innovate a drone-centric 
COIN, the Air Force confirms its 
relevance, reaffirms its mission, and guarantees it budgetary as well as decision-making 
privileges. According to organization theorists, these drivers of change are magnified in times of 
salient incidents like sudden ‘budgetary feast’ and major ‘performance failures’ as well as 
‘prolonged budgetary famine.’  Such events raise the stakes for an organization, especially those 18
16 To be clear, this is distinct from bureaucratic competition as a driving force of change in that way that a 
bureaucratic organization may seek to reaffirm its mission even in the absence of a competing bureaucracy.  
17 Morton Halperin. ​Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy​. Washington: Brookings Institution 1974, 39-40.  
18 According to Allison, more money allows the agency to experiment and expand, inducing change, but famine puts 
added pressure on the agency reform in order to prevent further famine and possible extinction. Dramatic 
performance failures likewise add pressure to the organization, for after huge slip-ups the organization has to prove 
that it deserves a budget and a place in the bureaucracy at all. 
15 
 that threaten it with extinction, and thus may drive it to reinvent itself or significantly change its 
course. 
However, what is more likely, according to organizational theorists, is that bureaucracies 
will change gradually, slowly incorporating lessons of the past (Levitt and March 1988; Halperin 
2006). Levitt and March explain this process of development, writing that organizations change 
incrementally “by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior.”   In this 19
way, change is driven by small improvements overtime as experiences become ingrained in an 
organization’s institutional memory. 
If bureaucratic theory explains learning in HA/DR operations, we should expect learning 
over time to be consistent and incremental. Each operation should produce learning in small but 
steady bursts, with large shocks after the time of the disaster. This is because each disaster 
uncovers more problems that may be fixed in future operations. In practice, this would embody 
the incorporation of simple operational fixes rather than, say, large structural overhauls. For 
example, the military might note that ships A, B, and C will better serve future disaster relief 
operations than ships 1, 2, and 3, but it will not significantly change the existing HA/DR model. 
Figure 1-2 provides a graphical representation of  what such learning could look like, driven by 
small, medium, and major operations.  
 
While the organizational model is useful for understanding some facets of military 
learning, it is less useful in explaining why and how the military learns in HA/DR. This is 
because the three major drivers of organizational learning are not present in HA/DR. These 
19 ​Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 14 1988, 
319-340.  
16 
 drivers are: 1) bureaucratic competition, 2) budgetary incentives, and 3) a mission-reaffirming 
operation.  
 
Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that military learning in these operations was 
motivated by any of the aforementioned drivers. Indeed, the desire to hold more bureaucratic 
influence or secure existential status appear 
largely unrelated to HA/DR. This occurs for 
several reasons. First, services do not 
compete to conduct these operations, 
especially in the Asia Pacific where the 
Marines consistently and reliably lead 
operations. Services do not want to divert 
resources from other training, lose fungible 
funding that could be utilized elsewhere, or 
voluntarily undertake a task for which they will not receive additional funding. Even if services 
wanted to compete, it would be nearly impossible to challenge the Marines’ amphibious 
capabilities. Second,  budgetary incentives are not present for HA/DR missions because it is not 
a resourced or funded task of the military.  Last and relatedly, disaster relief does not affirm or 20
advance the military’s core mission. As COL(ret.) Martin, Director of the Center for Excellence, 
rather humorously put it, at the end of the day “the purpose of the military is to kill and break 
things. We get resourced to execute ​that ​mission [not disaster relief].”  Simply put, the U.S. 21
20 Joseph ​Martin. (2017, January). Personal interview.  
21 Ibid.  
17 
 military in the Asia Pacific from 2004-2015 did not try to use disaster relief as a justification for 
expansion or improvement of certain units or services.”  Yet despite all of these obstacles, 22
significant improvements in disaster relief occurred over that period. Therefore, we must look to 
other theories of military learning to explain why and how the military has learned in disaster 
relief operations. 
 
The Culturalists  
While bureaucrats focus on the structure of bureaucracy, culturalists are concerned with 
the culture of bureaucracy (Builder 1989). According to these theorists, military culture--or 
institutional military ‘personality’-- has a tendency to be hostile to learning. Military culture is 
often seen as especially hierarchical and conservative. This represents a key point of departure 
between bureaucrats and culturalists:  while bureaucrats view military institutions as decelerating 
learning, culturalists see these structures as actively inhibiting learning (Nagl 2002). Nagl 
describes how this culture of inhibited learning manifested itself in the American military in 
Vietnam. He contrasts the American military culture with that of the British military and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  For Nagl, the differences are black and white: where the 23
British and the CIA recognize that change and innovation are good, the hierarchical, traditional 
U.S. military, led by “conventionally-minded powers,” rejects it.   24
22 ​Given all we know of the budgetary and strategic outlook over the course of those years, this makes sense. 
Between a general pivot to Asia and increased geopolitical competition, the U.S. military had numerous other 
priorities more closely aligned with its primary task of warfighting.  
23 Nagl highlights how the American military and its top brass remained married to conventional warfighting 
techniques despite their failure in Vietnam but the CIA welcomed innovation, developing new ways of fighting like 
in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group.  
24 John Nagl, ​Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife​, 128. 
18 
 So -- according to culturalist theories, how can the military reform itself? One answer is 
“maverick theory.” Change evolves through  the changemaker, such as a maverick officer, who 
is willing to fight against this traditional culture. History is ripe with examples of such 
changemakers, such as Petraeus and the 101st in Iraq, who wrote FM 3-24 or Special Forces 
officer MAJ Jim Gant, who rallied for a change of strategy in Afghanistan in his white paper 
“One Tribe at a Time.”  Gant’s ideas on how to improve security cooperation in Afghanistan 25
influenced decisions of top military and political leaders.  Rosen also notes the potential 26
influence of an individual changemaker, citing Charles de Gaulle and B.H. Liddell Hart as 
common examples of ‘mavericks’ who pushed “tradition-bound organizations to innovate.”   27
If maverick theory explains learning in HA/DR operations, we should expect learning to 
be remarkably inconsistent and unpredictable. This is because maverick theory relies on 
individuals to drive learning in their organization. To illustrate this point, it is useful to return to 
our example of General Petraeus in Iraq. Petraeus’ unit, the 101st, was learning at a rapid pace 
and adjusting successfully to the insurgency, unlike other divisions. In that situation, learning 
relied wholly on one changemaker -- General Petraeus -- and thus was discontinuous, 
idiosyncratic, and non-cumulative. In HA/DR, this process is illustrated by sharp increases in 
learning, followed by long periods of relapse. The amount of learning will exhibit extreme 
variation as individual leadership is both the catalyst and the driver of this learning. What this 
learning ought to look like is depicted by ​Figure 1.2​. Note the steep changes in slope as learning 
accelerates and then drops off, often resulting in a cumulative loss of institutional knowledge  
25 ​ Jim Gant. ‘One Tribe at a Time’. Nine Sisters Imports, Inc. 2009; David Wood. “In Afghanistan, A U.S. Special 
Forces Major’s Meteoric Rise And Humiliating Fall” 28 March 2014.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Stephen Rosen. ​Winning the Next War,​ 12.  
19 
  
Culturalists believe the military can increase its capacity to learn by fostering a culture of 
learning. To encourage such an environment, Nagl emphasizes that the military must incorporate 
a culture of critique into their organizational ethos. He acknowledges that doing so is extremely 
difficult in hierarchical organizations with conservative cultures. Yet it is not impossible; Nagl 
notes that the more horizontal CIA and British military have successfully cultivated an emphasis 
on learning whereas the American military has not.  
Despite the learning mechanisms put into place since the Vietnam War , conventional 
wisdom still maintains that the American military is not a learning organization.  Some point to 28
Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of this pervasive culture, where the military’s failure to learn 
from the mistakes of past small wars doomed its mission to failure. Others point to a general 
trend of anti-intellectualism and a culture that privileges mediocrity over excellence as two major 
reasons the American military remains stuck in the mud.   While such depictions of the 29
military’s culture may be extreme, they are rooted in truth; an extremely hierarchical system 
creates a disincentive to critique plans disseminated from higher-ups, and the military’s 
structures reward “checking the box” rather than generating new ideas.  Given this 30
representation of military culture, culturalists should not expect the military to learn in disaster 
relief operations, or even in most operations.  
Another weakness of culturalist theory is its implication that a bureaucracy structurally 
averse to learning cannot create a learning culture. However, this thesis argues that the military 
28 Rosa Brooks, “Knife: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John Nagl,” ​The Washington Post​, 18 
November 2014.  
29Thomas Ricks, “General Failure” ​The Atlantic​, November 2012.   
30Roxanne Bras, “Army Officer: I think I know why those departing Marine LTs wrote anonymously” ​Foreign 
Policy,​ 7 January 2013.  
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 has indeed established an ethos of learning and organizational improvement that manifests itself 
despite​ its bureaucratic tendency to stymie change. Institutional learning mechanisms create 
constructs that force formal processes of learning and incentivize informal processes. These 
processes demonstrate the military’s ability to incorporate certain experiential and 
cross-operational lessons without external pressures.  
In sum, each of these theories predicts that military learning in disaster relief will be 
difficult. Although these theories provide insight into the military learning process under typical 
conditions, none advance a convincing explanation as to why the military might learn in 
non-typical conditions like disaster relief operations. The realists assume learning will not occur 
without the pressure of a salient security threat; the bureaucrats do not address situations where 
an organization might learn by operating outside of its organizational purpose and in the absence 
of budgetary incentives; and culturalists do not address how an organization, while characterized 
by tradition and conservatism, might promote an indigenous learning culture without constant 
injections from maverick leadership. Thus, none of these theories explains why and how a 
military might learn in the absence of these drivers of change. And finally, none of these theories 
explains how a traditional, conservative, and hierarchical military might foster an ethos of 
learning nonetheless. In order to understand how the military might learn in disaster relief 
operations, we must first explain this institutionalization of learning and how this process may 
promote and sustain a culture of learning.  
 
An Institutionalized Learning Culture  
21 
 This thesis argues that even a military that is slow to learn will learn through the 
employment of institutional learning mechanisms. These institutional learning mechanisms 
ingrain learning as a habitual practice, allowing learning to occur even under unfavorable or 
hostile conditions. In so many words, the military is teaching itself to adapt to new situations -- it 
is learning how to learn. I label this habitual “learned” learning a “learning ethos.”  The effect of 31
this learning ethos is twofold. First, this learning ethos enhances the inputs of formal institutional 
learning mechanisms and produces better outputs (i.e. learning). Second, this learning ethos 
creates a culture of informal learning that emphasizes and rewards operational experience, 
individual reflection, and collective reflection through professional and social ‘networks of 
experience.’  This learning ethos produces powerful institutional incentives for learning via 32
these formal and informal channels. 
What are these institutionalized learning mechanisms? Broadly, this term references 
processes and institutions designed to generate lessons to be learned. These institutions force 
formal learning, at least to some extent, by requiring the collection, consolidation, and 
distribution of professional and operational feedback. These institutionalized learning 
mechanisms propel formal learning to completion, with an end result of new/updated doctrine, 
institutions, and practices.  
 What is formal learning? Formal learning is the process(es) generated by 
institutionalized learning mechanisms. The process of formal learning is practiced, deliberate, 
and often mandated by military policy. The most obvious indicator of formal learning within the 
31 Robert Axelrod, ​The Evolution of Cooperation​, Basic Books, 1984. It is worth noting that this theory has 
similarities to Robert Axelrod’s theory on cooperation, which argues that actors may cooperate upon learning that it 
is evolutionarily advantageous. According to Axelrod, once organizations learn to cooperate, they prefer 
cooperation. Likewise, the military has learned to learn and will continue to learn. 
32 Recall that culturalists say that the military lacks this ethos.  
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 military is the conducting of an After Action Review (AAR). The AAR is a structured debrief 
and collective reflection process used to analyze an event and propose recommendations for 
future training and operations. These formal learning processes are expected to culminate in the 
production of formal products, often indicated in changes in institutions and doctrine. While the 
products of formal learning are often not specifically required, they are usually expected based 
on best practices or precedent. These expectations generate an institutional consistency in the 
production of reports, doctrine, and institutions.  
Due to the stability of these institutionalized learning channels, learning should resemble 
an incremental accumulation of lessons overtime, with small dips and bumps from 
troubleshooting and simple fixes. In a situation with only formal learning at work, we would 
expect learning to mimic the model proposed by bureaucratic theory. Learning should be 
incremental, heightened by remarkable events (e.g. natural disaster responses), and the amount of 
learning should correspond directly to the number of problems encountered during the mission.  
In this way, formal learning is necessarily reflective: the process responds to actual, 
experienced events, so formal learning mechanisms can only fix problems that have happened in 
the past, rather than anticipating those that will happen in the future.  
What is informal learning? Informal learning is learning that occurs outside of formal 
channels. Informal learning is a product of a learning ethos, rather than the result of an action 
directly instigated by institutionalized learning mechanisms. An effective learning ethos prompts 
learning outside of structured channels, with larger social and professional rewards as learning 
becomes habitual and instinctive. Indicators of informal learning include individual attention to 
personal and collective experience, as well as experience-sharing through professional and social 
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 ‘networks of learning’. Informal learning relies on the presence of experienced individuals, and 
therefore we should expect this process to be fragile, sporadic, and non-cumulative. But at the 
same time, informal learning might also be more salient and have a stronger effect on actual 
practices. 
What are the differences between formal and informal processes of learning, and how do 
they interact? At a basic level, formal learning offers consistency. As long as institutionalized 
learning mechanisms are in place, formal learning will occur at some level. But, this learning 
may be inadequate or ineffective. Informal learning, on the other hand, provides lessons with 
greater relevance and stronger staying power, but will emerge on an inconsistent basis. When 
both processes work together, we should expect a synergistic relationship to propel learning over 
time. Informal learning augments the interpretation and implementation of formal learning, 
which, in turn, strengthens the formal learning process and leads to better formal learning 
products. As individuals gather knowledge --“lessons learned”— through personal experience 
and the experiences of others, the inputs of formal learning processes will be enhanced. 
Therefore, when working in tandem, we should expect formal and informal learning to increase 
total learning in a nonlinear fashion.  33
33 ​Caitlin McCarey (Wellesley ‘17) helped conceptualize and create this graph.  
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Institutionalization theory builds on the argument proposed by Janine Davidson in her 
book ​Lifting the Fog of Peace. ​In her conclusion, she proposes that institutionalized learning 
structures can force the military to learn. She grounds her argument in the same literature on 
organizational and military learning examined by this paper. 
This theory differs from and expands upon Davidson’s thesis in a number of ways. 
Significantly, Davidson’s method fails to disentangle the institutional learning process from 
other incentives to learn. Although Davidson does exceptional work in explaining how 
institutional mechanisms may force both formal and informal learning processes, her work falls 
short of explaining how these institutional mechanisms may work ​in spite of ​the absence of 
traditional incentives to learn. Davidson grounds her analysis in case studies of the war in Iraq, 
where most of the traditional incentives to learn were at play. Recall these incentives include 
high geopolitical threat, budgetary feast, and major shocks arising from significant military 
failures. The presence of these factors in Iraq, according to realist and organizational theorists, 
should incentivize military learning even in the absence of institutional learning mechanisms. 
Institutionalization theory, on the other hand, largely isolates the institutional learning process 
from traditional incentives and provides explanations for learning by examining how the military 
behaves in disaster relief operations.  
Davidson’s analysis also overlooks the limitations of institutional mechanisms as drivers 
of learning. I will demonstrate that by relying on past experience to drive the learning process, 
these institutions are necessarily retrospective rather than anticipatory. In this way, the military 
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 can quickly and impressively resolve problems experienced in past operations, but cannot 
effectively foresee or prevent future hazards.  
Institutionalization theory also shares several key characteristics with bureaucratic 
theories. For one, bureaucratic structure matters. The design of an organization will significantly 
affect its processes and the potential outcomes it can achieve. Just as adherence to standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) and heavily hierarchical structure affect output, I also argue that 
institutional structures designed to produce change also affect potential outcomes. However, this 
theory diverges from the bureaucrats in quantifying and describing what institutions do to the 
learning process. While the bureaucrats view institutionalized practices as conveniences for 
procedure but impediments to learning (e.g. functionality of SOPs), I argue that institutionalized 
practices geared toward learning will, in fact, drive it. Further, just as bureaucrats believe 
bureaucracies evolve slowly, institutionalization theory argues that change is likely to occur 
incrementally in disaster relief operations. Therefore, we should not expect large overhauls in 
doctrine, institutions, and practice for military learning, but rather limited troubleshooting and 
simple fixes. 
Additionally, this theory shares characteristics with the culturalists. For one, it 
understands how bureaucratic structure manifests itself in an organizational culture. This culture 
will create an ethos that affects how tolerant and supportive of learning the organization is. My 
argument emphasizes the importance of such an organizational culture, diverging from that of 
the culturalists in its view of learning culture. Nagl assumes that hierarchical, conservative, and 
traditional organizations cannot be learning organizations; my theory argues that an organization 
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 can possess ​all ​of these characteristics: the American military can be hierarchical, conservative, 
and traditional while also having a developed ethos of learning.  
 
In sum: how does the military learn in disaster relief operations?  The answer, I propose, 
lies in the synthesis of bureaucratic and culturalist theories of organizational learning. 
Conceptually, we may apply the metaphor of a runner training for the Boston Marathon. Even 
when she goes for a simple jog, the hours she has spent perfecting her stride will positively affect 
her form. In other words, even when she is not actively trying to apply her marathon training, 
such training becomes so ingrained it is applied unconsciously. In the same way, when members 
of the military comply with bureaucratic requirements for learning, these requirements  produce 
in some soldiers an ability and desire to learn even when operating outside of these requirements. 
In the metaphor of the marathon runner, the institutional mechanisms are the official marathon 
training, which are “mandated” for those who run a marathon. Formal learning is the 
development of good form while officially training for the marathon.  The learning ethos is 
created when the good form learned during marathon training spills over into casual jogs or 
warm-up exercises. Returning to the context of military operations, soldiers who learn via 
mandatory institutional learning channels may export their knowledge into new and different 
situations. The exportation of this knowledge from one situation to the next is what I have 
labeled an ethos of learning.  In the next section, I apply this definition to  measure learning in 34




34 Caitlin McCarey (Wellesley ‘17) developed this metaphor in honor of Patrick Hamon’s marathon run (Tufts ‘16).  
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Figure 1.6 Expectations for Military Learning 
Theories  Characterization of the military Expectations for 
learning  
Conditions for learning Expectation for 
learning in HA/DR 
Realist Tool of war, sensitive to international 
politics  
Neutral  High threat environment  Low 
Bureaucratic Slow bureaucracy, favors status quo Low, incremental  Times of unusual budgetary 
pressure/bureaucratic competition 
Low 
Culturalist Slow bureaucracy exacerbated by a 
particularly traditional, conservative 
culture  
Poor Maverick officer, built-in culture 
of critique/learning 
Low  
Institutionalization  Traditional, conservative bureaucracy Neutral Institutionalized learning culture  High  
 
 
Methodology:​ ​Measuring Learning  
This thesis tests institutionalization theory by examining three case studies of 
military-assisted disaster relief operations and measures changes in learning from each disaster. I 
sought to track the effects of multiple varying independent variables on the dependent variable of 
learning, as indicated by changes in doctrine, institutions, and practice. These independent 
variables include threat environment, bureaucratic context, organizational culture, and 
institutionalized structure in order to test realist, bureaucratic, organizational, and 
institutionalization theories, respectively.  We should see both the amount and type of learning 35
produced from the shock of each disaster to correspond to these independent variables.  
If realist theories are correct, we should see a positive correlation between threat 
environment and amount of learning. The higher the threat environment, the more learning we 
35 This structure includes a number of different mechanisms. Examples include the after action review process; Joint 
Lessons Learned Information System; the Center for Army Lessons Learned; the Marine Corps Center for Lessons 
Learned; the Navy Lessons Learned System; Air Force Knowledge Now; Training and Doctrine Command; the 
National Training Center; the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management; the Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute; and doctrine outlining the After Action Review process.  
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 should expect to see emerge from each of these disasters. If bureaucratic theories are correct, we 
should expect to see a positive correlation between variables that bureaucrats say trigger learning 
and learning itself. These include budgetary feast, budgetary famine, or bureaucratic 
competition. If culturalist theories are correct, we should expect to see a correlation between 
individual leadership actions and learning. We would see data subscribing substantial changes to 
certain individuals and their leadership ability. Similarly, culturalists would expect different 
levels of learning even within the same services as naturally some leaders perform better than 
others at instilling a positive learning culture.  If institutionalization theory is correct, we should 
expect to see a correlation between learning mechanisms/processes and amounts of learning. 
These learning mechanisms include: formal and informal learning processes and the presence of 
a learning ethos.  
Why is it reasonable to measure learning across crises events, which are highly varied? 
While these events look highly varied on the surface, the military’s role remains relatively 
constant throughout each of them. In each of these disasters, the military is tasked with a support 
role, to assist and support a whole of government response with its unique capabilities, which 
include logistics, manpower, and leadership. This role stays consistent across disasters of similar 
size and impact. I attempt to maximize and reinforce these consistencies through the cases that I 
chose.  
I examine two case studies of military disaster relief missions in the Asia Pacific region-- 
2004 Operation Unified Assistance and 2011 Operation Tomodachi. Additionally, I will look at 
the 2013 and 2015 operations in the Philippines and Nepal, respectively, but in a way that 
focuses on the events themselves, rather than the lessons drawn from the events. Each of these 
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 cases is of similar scale and impact, inducing a similar response from the American military. 
Further, I have chosen to focus on the Asia Pacific region in order to control for external 
variables, like changes in combatant commands. All military operations in the Asia Pacific are 
planned out of Pacific Command (PACOM) and during this period, the geopolitical threats in the 
region remained relatively constant, unlike geopolitical threats in other areas such as the Middle 
East. Additionally, many of the same component forces are deployed in each of these disasters 
out of PACOM. My two case studies are the 2004/2005 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2011 Triple 
Disaster (earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster) in Japan. I also touch on the 2013 Operation 
Damayan in the Philippines and the 2015 response in Nepal at a surface level, while analyzing 
learning post-Tomodachi, but I do not investigate learning from these crises. 
My first case study examines the Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) response to the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Rather than choosing an 
earlier disaster response, like the major 1991 Sea Angel response in Bangladesh, I chose to 
ground this analysis within contemporary disasters and for consistency of doctrinal context. 
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the military underwent severe ideological and physical 
restructuring. Most contemporary responses have been conducted in this post-9/11 military, and 
the 2004 OUA was the first major response executed under the military’s new posture. Because 
the disaster and response alike were massive, we should expect many complete lessons to 
emerge from it. The next case study is another major disaster of similar levels of destruction and 
disaster -- the U.S. response to the 2011 Triple Disaster in Japan, Operation Tomodachi. If the 
military managed to learn lessons completely in the 2004 OUA, we would expect to see those 
lessons reflected in the 2011 response. Therefore, I use this mission as a test to determine what 
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 was and what was not learned from OUA. I also use Operation Tomodachi to measure learning 
for a second time. Because Operation Tomodachi was, like OUA, a massive response, I 
anticipate that it induced a similar amount of lessons and learning alike.  
The next challenge is setting a baseline level of learning that will occur in general. 
Overall, we should expect military learning in these events to be present but underutilized; 
lessons are noted by soldiers on the ground and passed up the chain of command, but they are 
not incorporated into significant doctrinal, institutional, or practical changes. This baseline is 
derived from accounts of actual military learning during the small wars prior to the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Before Iraq and Afghanistan, the lessons collected in the context of small 
wars had failed to culminate in joint doctrine, institutions, or training. Lessons from Vietnam 
were noted, and some low-level doctrine were produced (particularly by the Marines), but until 
the insurgency in Iraq pressured the military to reform, substantial learning in small wars did not 
take place.  
To develop a clear picture of disaster relief operations, I gathered data from two primary 
sources: military reports and interviews with practitioners of disaster relief. I interviewed over 40 
officials from United States Pacific Command in Honolulu (PACOM), United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Center for Excellence (CFE), the Department of State, 
relevant nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as scholars of disaster relief and crisis 
management. A full list of interviewees is annexed at the end of this paper. I also analyzed After 
Action Reports (AARs) from USPACOM and deployed forces like 3rd MEB, USAID, and 
NGOs. Additionally, I gathered open source data, primarily from other research organizations 
like RAND and news reports on crises. One significant benefit of studying disaster relief 
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 operations is that almost all the relevant data is unclassified. Thus, officials were able to speak 
more candidly with me than they would otherwise be able to. Additionally, all the AARs and 
documentation on this data is unclassified; anyone with a government common access card may 
access and review this information. Therefore, I am confident my data provides an accurate 
snapshot of what occurred during these missions.  
That said, my data has at least two potential limitations. First, natural disasters are 
notoriously difficult to study and compare over time. Each disaster brings a host of unique issues 
that may affect the way any one particular response is conducted. For instance, a disaster in 
Indonesia is going to look quite different than one in a developed, wealthy country like Japan. 
While I attempt to control for dramatic differences by studying disaster responses conducted out 
of the same combatant command, of similar scale, and within ten years of one another, I 
understand that that random uncontrollable variables may have affected observations. Further, 
while disasters themselves are unique, the military's role in these responses are relatively 
consistent: the military provides ‘unique capabilities’ in a disaster, usually in the forms of 
logistical support and manpower. Second, it is difficult to disaggregate precisely who/what 
organization is doing the learning after these disasters because they are huge interorganizational 
undertakings, whole of government responses. It is thus at times murky to judge precisely from 
where these changes emerged. In this thesis, I have sought to mitigate this problem by focusing 
on the military’s role and changes, rather than larger changes (e.g. I am not interested in the 
changes that the UN made to its response after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami).  
This thesis proceeds as follows in order to test institutionalization theory and express 
findings: To begin, I offer an overview of the U.S. disaster relief response protocol. This will 
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 familiarize the reader with the highly complicated, messy process that occurs when the U.S. 
government initiates a disaster relief response. Next, I review past literature on military learning. 
In chapters two through four, I explore and analyze three different case studies of military-led 
disaster relief operations. Case I is the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Response, Case II is the 
response to the 2011 Triple Disaster in Japan. The penultimate chapter examines how other 
combatant commands handle disaster relief operations and highlights the implications of these 



















 Chapter II 
The Military’s Role in Disaster Relief 
 
This brief chapter provides important context for the remainder of this thesis by 
explaining the military’s role in disaster relief operations led by the U.S. Government.  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead agency in 
disaster relief operations. In particular, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
prepares for, helps to coordinate, and leads all U.S. government disaster relief missions. OFDA 
responds to dozens of natural disasters each year, most of which are small-scale disasters. The 
military is traditionally only called to assist in major natural disasters, when USAID is 
overwhelmed and in need of logistical support and additional manpower. In the wake of a 
disaster, protocol dictates that the host nation should request support from the U.S. government 
through its American ambassador. The ambassador will then request assistance from OFDA, 
who requests assets from the DoD in D.C., and the DoD there finally issues the order to the 
appropriate combatant command. In many cases, this process faces complications or is otherwise 
delayed, but in general, these are the formal mechanisms in place to coordinate the U.S. response 
to international natural disasters.  If military commanders near the “immediate scene of a 36
foreign disaster” determine that urgent action is required, they may act unilaterally and secure 
“approval for continued assistance” within 72 hours.   37
The U.S. responds to approximately 70-80 disasters per year, and most of these 
operations are conducted by USAID alone. Of these annual disasters, the DoD is traditionally 
36 Charles M. Perry and Marina Travayiakis, “The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process,” ​The Institute for 
Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. ​May 2008.  
37Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., “Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” RAND Corporation, 2013. 
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 called to support about 10-15 percent of them.  Although the number of disasters with DoD 38
involvement is small compared to the number of U.S. disaster responses per year, most of the 
disasters supported by American authorities are of remarkable magnitude. As former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership and Stability Operations James Schear writes, 
“This is largely due to the unique contribution our military can make to these types of responses. 
Capabilities such as strategic airlift, expeditionary medical care and engineering enable the USG 
(U.S. Government) to provide quick support to affected countries in the immediate aftermath of a 
devastating disaster.”  Manpower is also a critical asset that the U.S. military can bring to the 39
table whereas others cannot.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, the primary role of the American military is one of support 
and assistance to authorities. This assistance enables and augments the capabilities of other U.S. 
government and foreign actors: USAID, local civil society organizations, foreign NGOs, and the 
host nation’s own military. The support provided by the military is critical for an effective 
disaster response in a devastated area. Its capabilities allow for the movement of goods and 
coordination of people across places where all means of transportation and communication have 
been destroyed. In this way, the military acts as both glue and grease: holding together a large 






38 “Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for JTF Commanders”, 13 July 2011.  
39 ​Ibid​.  
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 Chapter III  
Operation Unified Assistance and Simple Fixes 
 
“In 2004, we saw the disaster on the news and thought ‘oh we’re going somewhere’. The 
DoD is going to respond to this because no one else can. No one else can bring what we can 
bring.”   40
-​Colonel (R) Douglas Sevier, Deputy Commander 374th Operations Group, PACAF C130 Commander in 
Operation Unified Assistance 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to set a baseline for military learning in order to test our 
theories of military learning.This chapter argues that the military learned from Operation Unified 
Assistance despite the absence of traditional incentives to learn, and that institutionalization 
theory best explains this learning. In order to accomplish this task, I first provide an overview of 
the disaster and the American military response, followed by an analysis of key operational 
successes and shortcomings. Second, I identify institutional and doctrinal changes that were 
incorporated as a result of this disaster. This demonstrates how the military learned from this 
operation despite an operational environment that, by traditional standards, is adverse to 
learning. Finally, this chapter concludes by looking forward toward the second case study, 
Operation Tomodachi, in 2011. In that chapter, we will see how these changes from OUA were 
incorporated into operational practice.  
 
The Disaster and Operation Unified Assistance  
On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.3 undersea earthquake erupted in the Indian 
Ocean off the coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The earthquake triggered a wave of 
tsunamis, destroying large parts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand.The force of the earthquake 
40 ​Douglas Sevier. (2017, January). Personal interview. 
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 and the resulting tsunamis were felt throughout South and Southeast Asia, and down the 
northeastern Africa coast in Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania. Over 150,000 people died in the 
immediate aftermath. Within hours,then-President George W. Bush publicly expressed his 
support to the affected communities. Within days, he pledged to contribute $350 million in aid.  
But even before receipt of orders, U.S. soldiers and sailors began to respond. Joint forces 
at PACOM headquartered at Camp Smith in Honolulu, Hawaii, began assembling what became 
Combined Support Force 536. These forces, later called the Combined Task Force , began 41
planning the largest natural foreign disaster response in America’s history -- Operation Unified 
Assistance. Because of its strong presence in the Pacific, amphibious capabilities, and experience 
in disaster relief, Marine Forces Pacific took the lead in  this humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief operation. The Marines, in turn, assigned III Marine Expeditionary Force as the core JTF 
staff to lead the relief effort. This means that the Marine Forces Pacific was responsible for 
supporting the chain of command for the operation, and for keeping control of the operation all 
other participating military services, e.g. U.S. Pacific Air Forces, reported to Marine Forces 
Pacific.  
PACOM’s official mission was to provide “assistance to the governments of Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the recent earthquake 
and tsunami in the Indian Ocean.”   42
On December 27th, one day after the disaster, U.S. Ambassadors to Indonesia, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, and the Maldives issued disaster declarations. This prompted the military to quickly 
deploy a strike group spearheaded by the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, a seven-ship 
41 The name of the JTF was changed to the Combined Support Force CSF later in the operation.  
42 Operation Unified Assistance, Pacific Command General PPT, provided by Admiral Thomas Fargo.  
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 expeditionary strike group led by the USS Bonhomme Richard, and the hospital ship USNS 
Mercy. Within 72 hours of the disaster, U.S. aircrews were delivering the first load of relief 
supplies -- primarily research and rescue teams, food, water, and medical equipment -- into the 
area. By the end of the first week in January, the “American military deployed over twenty-five 
Navy ships, forty-five fixed-wing aircraft, and fifty-eight helicopters” and had delivered over 
610,000 pounds of water, food, and supplies to the region.  The American military assisted 43
efforts in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.   44
Like previous disaster relief operations, Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) was 
conducted in support of host nation operations and, on the U.S. government side, in support of 
USAID. Six USAID disaster assistance response teams (DART) deployed to Thailand 
immediately, eight DART members to Sri Lanka, later joining a part of a large 40-person 
regional USAID/DART team.  DART team members are experts in disaster relief, and they 45
coordinate and advise the U.S. government’s response to a disaster. The American whole of 
government response also had significant help from other world actors, with participation from 
affected countries as well as 21 other nations. In total, partner nations lent 92 airplanes, 103 
helicopters, 102 ships, 18 medical teams, 2 logistics teams, and 10 engineer teams. The U.S. 
itself lent 45 ships, 57 airplanes, and 25 helicopters. Additionally, hundreds of local and global 
NGOs rushed to give support to the area. A multi-country DART team was also employed. 
Coordination among participating nations largely fell upon the U.S. military because of its 
capabilities and familiarity with logistical operations. 
43 ​Bruce A. Elleman, “Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia,” Naval 
War College Press, February 2007.  
44 The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management,“Lessons from Typhoon Haiyan” ​The Liaison, A Journal of 
Civil-Military Disaster Management & Humanitarian Relief Collaborations​, Volume VII, (Spring 2015), p 14  
45 USAID, “INDIAN OCEAN -- Earthquake and Tsunamis,” Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Year 2005  
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 The role of the American military in OUA, as per usual, focused on logistical assistance, 
coordination, heavy lifting, providing airlift, transportation, search and rescue, aid delivery, and 
personnel transport to both orchestrate and conduct these exercises. The military also assisted 
and coordinated other militaries, USAID DART teams, local government relief forces, and NGO 
volunteers. In total, JFACC operations moved over 75% of all air-delivered goods and services. 
These operations lasted for about two months.   46
The global community and the military itself heralded OUA as a successful operation. As 
former PACOM commander Admiral Thomas Fargo recalled, “this will go down as one of the 
worst natural disasters in our history. But it will go down as one of the international 
community’s best collective efforts in the support of humanity.”  The military reacted with 47
speed and efficiency, delivering the first round of supplies just days after the tsunami struck. 
Admiral Fargo recalls that upon hearing of the disaster on the news, they immediately began to 
plan a response and had developed a concept of operations even before they had been called 
upon by OFDA to do so.  Previous SOPs created by the Cobra Gold disaster relief exercise 48
allowed them to easily choose Utapao as the command headquarters and the Marines as the lead 
response team. Post-operations data collection appeared to confirm these were successful 
decisions: one survey found that as many as 65% of Indonesians held a more favorable view of 
the U.S. after the conclusion of the operation. In total, military delivered over 24 million pounds 
of relief supplies and performed almost 20,000 medical procedures, saving countless lives.  49
46On January 22nd, support groups and ships began standing down and on February 12 the JTF 526 ended operations  
47 ​Thomas Fargo. (2017, March). Telephone interview.  
48Thomas Fargo. (2017, March). Telephone interview.  
49 Eben Kaplan, “​Tsunami Rebuilding Efforts, One Year Later,” ​The Council on Foreign Relations, ​22 December 
2005; ​Andrea H. Cameron, “The Legacy of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami on U.S. Maritime 
Strategy,” CIMSEC, 1 April 2016  
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Shortcomings and Lessons to be Learned  
In this section, I will highlight some of the key deficiencies with the operations and 
highlight patterns among them. I argue that from these problems emerges a trend of lack of 
preparation, and that at the time of OUA, the military conducted HA/DR in a reactionary rather 
than anticipatory manner. In the subsequent chapters, we will see that the military learned to 
become an anticipatory force. This section begins by unpacking some of the major problems and 
analyzing why they occurred. Then, it describes the type of learning that occurred between 
Operation Unified Assistance and our second case, Operation Tomodachi.  
 
As previously stated, at the time of OUA, the military performed HA/DR operations in a 
reactionary manner rather than an anticipatory one. While it is true that natural disasters and their 
effects are largely unpredictable, the problems encountered in OUA may have been mitigated by 
developing a tentative plan.  
The confusion and inconsistency in the distribution of goods during OUA illustrates the 
military’s reactionary posture and the problems that posture can create. The military had no 
standard way of measuring the effectiveness of its distribution plan, as in which goods were 
getting where they need to go and how fast. Lack of planning resulted in both meaningless 
measurements and inconsistent means of measurement across various parts of the chain of 
command. Some teams initially used sorties (a sortie is one operational flight made by a single 
aircraft) to measure effectiveness, but, as the AAR notes, “sorties are a relatively meaningless 
[measurement],” because they measure input rather than output and their relative sizes and 
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 carrying capacities vary dramatically. Other teams tried to measure number of pounds of food 
delivered per person per day as correlated with capacity for movement. The joint command cell 
used pounds of goods delivered to specific locations.  
In addition to measuring goods, distribution plans themselves were only partially 
developed. While the military demonstrated incredible speed and effectiveness in its reaction, it 
is unclear whether the distribution system in place was the best one. Colonel Sevier noted this 
point, saying that the military in OUA “lost track” of distribution efforts, failing to assess 
whether or not goods actually got to the victims who needed them. He emphasized, “​Flow 
matters just as much as speed and quantity of goods [in providing relief].”  50
Two other problems illustrate the reactionary nature of this operation: the confusion 
about C2 relationships. According to AARs, the operation suffered from a delay in establishing 
“clear and unambiguous command relationships,” which hindered efforts, particularly 
distribution efforts, for weeks.   Rather than creating a unified command, the joint task force 51
headquarters in Thailand established four separate subcommands for air assets and air 
distribution. None of these subcommands were required to synchronize their operations with the 
delivery of relief supplies. These command problems resulted in the severe backlogs of material 
on limited airfield ramps.  And in this disaster, speed of delivery was key. The delay in 52
establishing a clear chain of command created a backlog of supplies like food, water, and 
medicine, leading to detrimental effects on suffering communities.  
 
50 ​Douglas Sevier. (2017, January). Personal interview. 
51 “International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations,”Joint Center for Operational Analysis/ 
Joint Forces Command, January 2007.  
52 Ibid.  
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 The two most salient problems with Operation Unified Assistance were 1) deficient 
coordination and 2) friction between military and civilian organizations. These problems were 
likewise exacerbated by a reactionary posture. Although the organizations reportedly understood 
the basics of one another's roles and purposes, the military failed to institute practices to best 
facilitate coordination between the two actors.  Most civil-military coordination efforts were 53
conducted out of the Combined Coordination Cell in Utapao, Thailand, in coordination with the 
Combined Support Force Headquarters.   54
Civil-military shortcomings manifested themselves in a number of ways. Most basically, 
many civilian actors were not physically present at the Combined Coordination Cell, preventing 
them from adding input during the planning process. Relatedly, the communication that did 
occur among the various NGOs, IGOs, and nations was unstructured, as few SOPs had been set 
in place prior to the operation.  Further, the operation suffered from a scarcity of liaisons to 55
facilitate coordination and communication. There was no joint control board or civil-military 
airlift/logistics liaison to facilitate communication between the NGOs who needed supplies or 
personnel moved and the military who had the equipment and manpower to move them. At the 
beginning of this operation, there were no daily ‘sync’ meetings between NGO and military 
actors in some areas of the operation. The absence of these three factors -- liaison roles, 
communication SOPs, and daily syncing procedures -- had a palpable effect on operations. Many 
NGO requests for movement did not reach the military, and others were received so late that the 
53 ​B. Lynn Pascoe. (2017, April). Telephone interview.  
54 Charles Daly, “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Communications for the 21st Century,” ​Naval War 
College​, 10 May 2007.  
55 ​“International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations,” p 27.  
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 NGOs were forced to “find alternate means” of transportation and assistance. These 
miscommunications prevented the military from fulfilling the very role it was deployed to fill.   56
This reactionary posture is also evident in several of the military’s decisions after the 
commencement of the operation. For example, the military began including civilian agencies in 
nightly staff meetings and changed the name of JTF 536 to Combined Support Force 536. This 
language reflected the inclusion of civilian ‘support forces’ rather than only military ‘tasked 
forces’ in the operation. While these changes demonstrate excellent adaptation, they also 
represent initial deficiencies. Rather than anticipating such a disaster and developing contingency 
plans, the military only began planning for the operation after the disaster had occurred. Simple 
fixes could have included standardizing metrics used to measure progress, estimating the amount 
of supplies for different populations, and establishing SOPs for interorganizational 
communication for HA/DR operations. Rather than developing a plan for civil-military 
coordination before the disaster, key mechanisms -- e.g. the nightly interorganizational meetings 
-- were executed ad-hoc. 
 
This reactionary posture toward HA/DR operations is likewise evident when we look 
beyond the friction points and examine the operation through wider lenses. Discussing how the 
concept of logistics for the operation came into being, Combined Support Force Commander 
LTG Robert Blackman recalled, “we studied very quickly in the limited time we had for 
planning.” Specifically, his team located and examined the lessons learned from Operation Sea 
Angel, a disaster response in 1991.  While LTG Blackman’s account demonstrates impressive 57
56 Ibid.  
57 ​The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management,“Lessons from Typhoon Haiyan” ​The Liaison, A Journal of 
Civil-Military Disaster Management & Humanitarian Relief Collaborations​, Volume VII, (Spring 2015), 14  
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 initiative, it also highlights a reactive posture. Instead of intensely ‘studying’ to prepare for 
another such disaster, much of the planning and concept design for the operation took place ​after 
disaster struck.  
To be fair, there is evidence to suggest that this reactionary HA/DR posturing was 
emblematic of the government’s response as a whole, and not just the military’s response. 
Ambassador Lauren Moriarty, Ambassador to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation at the 
time of the tsunami, remarked that the government, “does not do a good job in pre-crisis 
planning.” She outlined a number of simple ways in which the military could better prepare for 
these disasters in general, such as establishing relationships with private sector companies like 
FedEx, prepositioning equipment, and designating media contacts, among other things.  58
To some extent, crisis operations, by necessity, must always be planned simultaneously 
with their executions. LTG Blackman described this process as “planning your family vacation 
while you are packing the car.”  Nonetheless, anticipatory measures can still be put in place to 59
mitigate some of these major problems. We will see in later chapters that both formal 
institutional learning mechanisms and an informal learning ethos allowed the military to learn 
from these shortcomings. Eventually, we see evidence that the military shifted its posture on 
disaster relief from reacting to anticipating and preparing.  
 
One final problem worth mentioning was not a direct shortcoming of OUA but speaks to 
a larger problem within the military’s operational framework. At the time of OUA, the military 
did not prioritize building trust and cohesion among military and civilian actors. Around the time 
58 Lauren Moriarty, (2017, January), Telephone Interview 
59 Elleman, ​Waves of Hope​, p 34. 
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 of this tsunami, collaboration among NGOs, the UN, USAID, and the American military in 
various global operations (like the war in Iraq) had increased, but remained relatively low. Below 
the highest command levels, few officers had worked intimately with civilian organizations and 
few knew much about them. The Air Force officer Colonel (R) Sevier who commanded the 
C-130s and helicopters operating out of Indonesia recalls the following humorous story:  
 
“...When the NGOs first showed up I was working in my uniform, and I needed to make 
a copy, so I walked over the copy machine. This young lady standing by the copy 
machine saw me walk up and got this look of terror on her face, stepping back from the 
copier in fear. Ha, I don’t know what she thought I was going to do! She was absolutely 
terrified of the military.”  
  
Distrust of the military was common for NGO workers at the time. As one Mission to the 
World worker recalls, “there was a general skepticism about the military from the NGO 
community...there’s a general feeling that as soon as you have the military involved, you 
wonder, ‘Hm. Why exactly are they here?’”  On the other side of the coin, Colonel Sevier 60
recalled his own unfamiliarity with the NGOs. In his fifteen years of service in the Air Force, he 
had never before worked with an NGO. Thus, although civil-military cooperation was discussed 
in doctrine at this point, it was by no means habitual or well-implemented.  
 
Learning from Operation Unified Assistance  
How did the military translate lessons observed during OUA into lessons learned, if at 
all? In this section, I show how the military successfully implemented ‘simple-fixes’ in the form 
of doctrinal and institutional changes. It will be helpful at this point to recall our baseline for 
learning. Given the lack of incentive -- perhaps even disincentive -- to learn effectively during 
60 ​Christina ​Davies. (2017, February). Telephone interview. 
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 HA/DR operations, overall we should expect the military to collect observations but fail to 
implement doctrinal, institutional, and practical changes.  
 
Products of Learning 
The majority of lessons learned from OUA directly addressed problems encountered in 
OUA. They were not anticipatory reforms.  
In order to address frustrations with distribution, the military updated distribution plans in 
JP 3-07.6 ‘Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance’ 
doctrine, detailing best practices for distribution coordination. It separates three different kinds of 
distribution in order to clearly define its own role with respect to that of other organizations. In 
defining these roles, the military sought to clarify command and control (C2) ambiguities 
experienced in OUA. Additionally, the military even created a new doctrine solely for 
‘distribution operations.’ This new doctrine, JP 4-09, specifically addressed military distribution 
in disaster relief operations.  
Relatedly, the military tackled problems of C2. It published an updated version of its 
HA/DR doctrine JP 3-29. The military added changes to JP 3-29 to clarify C2 roles and provide 
guidance for better civil-military coordination in a disaster response.  For example, it clearly 61
indicates that USAID is the lead organization in these disaster responses. It also includes 
extensive descriptions of each agency and how the military can best interact with that agency in 
case of an emergency. Additionally, the military published updates to JP 3-08 defining how the 
61 “​Department of Defense: Joint Publication 3-29 on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance” ​The Council on Foreign 
Relations​, 17 March 2009.  
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 military’s organizational purpose in HA/DR can best sync with that of other agencies and 
organizations.  
Next, the military sought to amend problems of civil-military coordination. They did this 
in a number of ways. First, JP 3-29 outlined ideas for more effective communication between 
military and civilian actors. The new doctrine suggested a collaborative, non-secure information 
network; the employment of liaison officers to facilitate information sharing; and the need to 
include civilian organizations in the operational assessments and planning processes (JP 3-29, 
I-2).  Institutionally, the military assigned representatives from the Department of State’s U.S. 62
Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) to most geographic combatant commands, including PACOM, to ensure that the U.S. 
military’s humanitarian-assistance efforts are well-planned and synchronized during 
disaster-response operations. Likewise, USAID added an Office of Military Affairs (now called 
the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation).   63
The military also sought to mitigate civilian-military friction points through increased 
contact among agencies in practical exercises. The first of many Asia Pacific Conferences on 
Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations was held, spearheaded by UNOCHA and the 
Center for Excellence. According to UNOCHA, this conference emerged “in the wake of the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami” to close the civ-mil gap that emerged during these operations.  The 64
military has sent representatives to this conference each year since its conception. Additionally 
62 Joint Staff “Joint Publication 3-29,” Chapter I-II, I-2.  
63 ​Michael​ ​Reilly. (2017, January). Personal interview; ​Suzanne Basalla et al., “Managing Foreign Assistance in a 
CBRN Emergency The U.S. Government Response to Japan’s ‘Triple Disaster’” National Defense University Press 
Issue 68 (1st Quarter 2013). 27.  
64 UNOCHA, “The Asia Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations  (APC MADRO)  
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 after OUA, tabletop disaster relief exercises were added, like the ARF Disaster Relief Desk-top 
Exercise in Darwin, Australia, conducted from September 4-7, 2007.   65
 
Analysis of Learning 
This section seeks to evaluate the explanatory power of each learning theory based on the 
character and amount the learning observed from OUA. From the information above, it is clear 
that the military both engaged in learning processes and produced some -- albeit limited -- 
learning products. What explains this learning? Why did it happen at all, and why did it happen 
in the way that it did?  
We can draw from our realist, bureaucratic, and culturalist theories to produce potential 
hypotheses for military learning in OUA. These theories must address two different questions. 
First, according to each theory, were the conditions that catalyze learning present during OUA? 
And second, do the content, rate, and nature of the learning match the predictions of that theory?  
 
First, we will examine the realist theory. According to this theory, the conditions for 
learning were only partially present during OUA. Realists might argue that the military’s 
learning in this situation can be explained by rising security threats or the U.S. military’s 
interests in the Asia Pacific region around the time of the disaster. Additionally, realists would 
conclude that learning in disaster relief operations serves American security interests because it 
allows the military to demonstrate its power in a region and partially stabilize a destabilized 
region. In Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific, demonstration of U.S. power via disaster relief 
65 ​Ibid​.  
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 operations may dull the threat of Chinese regional expansion. Thus, if the American government 
is concerned about a rising China and top military leaders stand attentive to regional security 
threats, learning should occur in HA/DR operations there. In this scenario, policymakers and 
practitioners will view HA/DR as a vehicle for achieving security objectives, rather than an 
operation conducted for moral purposes. In order to evaluate the explanatory power of this 
hypothesis, we must first determine the extent to which these conditions apply in the case of 
OUA.  
While the American government was concerned with the rising power of China around 
the time of the tsunami disaster, it was also largely distracted by the War on Terror in the Middle 
East. The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), which was written during the disaster, notes 
the importance of integrating China into the global economy. Overall, the 2006 NSS mentions 
“China” 28 times and “Asia” 31 times. In comparison, the document references “terror” or 
“terrorism” almost 150 times.  This prioritization of the War on Terror was felt both within 66
military strategy and at an operational level. Although Admiral Thomas Fargo, former 
Commander of PACOM, emphasized that his organization was “dealing with an emerging 
China” at the time of the tsunami, he added that a top security priority for the Navy in 2004 was 
the War on Terror.   67
While the military may peripherally attain strategic benefits from conducting HA/DR 
operations, few interviewees cited hard strategic interests as the reason the military conducts 
these missions. In terms of palpable strategic benefits, the most the U.S. would gain would be 
boosts to its international reputation and reinforcement of the global order. To be clear, this does 
66 For reference, Obama’s 2015 NSS mentioned “China” and “Asia” a total of 35 times, but also mentions “terror” 
and “terrorism” only a combined total of 54 times, a 150% decrease from Bush’s 2006 NSS 
67 Thomas ​Fargo. (2017, March). Telephone Interview.  
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 not mean that there are not strategic benefits to HA/DR operations, nor that the U.S. ought not 
conduct them, but rather emphasize that the benefits are not felt at the military, operational level 
and thus insufficiently explain military learning in this case. Lieutenant Colonel Matelski, 
PACOM Ground Operations Planner and Civil Affairs Officer, goes as far as to classify HA/DR 
as a secondary mission, separating it from primary defense goals. He said that HA/DR is in 
America’s interest, insofar as it... 
 
“...doesn’t interfere with [the military’s] primary mission of defending the homeland and 
defending our nation. It’s all about building relationships, ensuring that the U.S. government is 
perceived in a positive light, and providing support to nations that don’t have the capability to do 
it.”  68
Given these conditions surrounding OUA, the explanatory power of realist theories of 
military learning are suspect. Next, we evaluate bureaucratic theories.  
Drawing from bureautic theories of organizational learning, some may argue that the 
military’s post 9/11 budgetary feast led to learning from OUA. An increase in overall budget 
allowed the military to invest more in non-combat operations, training, and personnel, which in 
turn led to an increase in the amount of resources available for HA/DR. Learning during OUA 
may have been higher than normal if there was indeed an increased budget for HA/DR and 
HA/DR-related institutions (e.g. the Center for Excellence). If this was the case, we should 
observe the deployment of more personnel and training to OUA than to traditional HA/DR. In 
order to evaluate the explanatory power of this hypothesis, we must first determine the extent to 
which these conditions apply in the case of Operation Unified Assistance.  
The military experienced dramatic budgetary expansion post 9/11 and around the time of 
the disaster.  However, it would be inaccurate to argue these budgetary increases benefitted 69
68 Thomas ​Matelski. (2017, January). Personal Interview.  
69 Dinah Walker, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending,” The Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2014.  
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 HA/DR operations because most of this surplus was immediately poured into the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. In fact, there is far more evidence to suggest that HA/DR suffered as a priority 
amidst these broader budgetary cuts.  Indeed, many resources that had previously been allocated 70
for HA/DR were repurposed for the War on Terror or ‘borrowed’ for operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
Admiral Fargo described this dynamic and how it affected the military’s posturing at 
PACOM. He said, “We were about 18 months into Iraq at the time; efforts were supporting War 
on Terror.” American forces in the Asia Pacific, he continued, were a “principle force provider 
for the wars in Afghanistan in Iraq, training forces that could deploy to the CENTCOM AOR 
[areas of operations]...”  Fargo also discussed how PACOM had set up a JTF in the Philippines 71
to advise and assist the execution of Enduring Freedom, further contributing to the shift in 
resources from HA/DR operations to the War on Terror.  Even the Center for Excellence in 72
Disaster Management, which was conceived for the purpose of improving humanitarian and 
disaster relief operations, was re-purposed to support the War on Terror. Rather than researching 
and preparing for disaster responses, CFE’s mission was refocused to address terrorism. CFE 
responded by developing terrorism-response training programs and working on peacekeeping 
operation training.  In short, HA/DR did not benefit from the budgetary feast caused by the War 73
on Terror.  Rather, HA/DR lost necessary resources and fell even lower on the military’s list of 
operational priorities.  
70 It is worth recalling that bureaucratic theory claims that budgetary famine, not simply cuts, will prompt learning-- 
the budgetary cuts must reach force the organization into a state of existential crisis in order for learning to be 
triggered. 
71 Thomas ​Fargo. (2017, March). Telephone Interview. 
72 ​Thomas ​Fargo. (2017, March). Telephone Interview. 
73 ​Stephanie Pezard et al., “The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance 
(CFE-DMHA): An Assessment of Roles and Missions,”RAND Corporation, 2016.  
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 The predictions of bureaucratic theory roughly match the character of the learning 
observed in OUA. Learning was incited by a remarkably disastrous event, the content of the 
lessons included quick fixes, and the learning process was largely a reflective one. However, 
bureaucratic theory fails to address why learning processes might take place beyond these 
immediate and simple fixes, and why informal learning processes were at work.  
 
Drawing upon culturalist theories of organizational learning, some may argue that the 
military’s command leadership were the source of the learning that emerged from OUA. One 
highly motivated individual, or perhaps even a team of highly motivated individuals, fought 
against a bureaucratic culture resistant to change and pushed lessons learned into changes in 
institutions and doctrine nonetheless.  
These theories, however, fail to explain both the character of the learning product and the 
nature of the learning process that we saw post-OUA. Recall that the learning observed after 
OUA was not a sharp spike, as the maverick explanation predicts, but rather the deliberate and 
simple incorporation of lessons learned into practices. Further, we did not see ‘a few good men’ 
working to upend the system, but rather an ​ecosystem​ of practiced learning. Though it was not 
required, each line of effort conducted an AAR to be passed along to planning and research 
teams.  
In sum, while the explanations above provide important context for how the military may 
learn under other conditions, these theories fail to provide a compelling explanation for the 
amount and type of learning that occurred from OUA. As discussed above, the military felt 
relatively low pressure in the Asia Pacific region at the time of OUA; there were more 
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 bureaucratic disincentives than incentives to improve and pursue a permanent leading role in 
these operations; and there were no signs of maverick officers pursuing change. Thus, there must 
be another force at work. There must be another force compelling the military to: 1) initiate the 
formal learning process, 2) complete that formal learning process by creating products of 
doctrinal and institutional change, and 3) begin the informal learning process. The conditions and 
learning outcomes for OUA are summarized below. 















Partial  No  No Yes Yes Incomplete To be seen 
 
 
Based on the information highlighted above, we know that a mechanism other than the 
ones described by realist, bureaucratic, and culturalist theories triggered the learning post-OUA. 
The variables either were not potent enough or were not even present, and therefore could not 
have produced the amount of learning that we observed. What ​was​ present, though, were 
institutionalized learning mechanisms, as well as formal and informal processes. 
At the time of OUA, a number of institutionalized learning mechanisms were available 
and had been used for years by the military. These include, but are not limited to: an 
indoctrinated AAR process, online experience/lesson-collection portals, and research centers. In 
general, utilization of these learning resources is not required, but is strongly encouraged by 
institutional mechanisms as detailed in doctrine on the operations process. Nonetheless, after 
OUA, each line of effort and command team conducted an after action review process and 
inputted collected lessons to their services’ respective online experience-collection platforms 
(e.g. the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Joint Lessons Learned Information System). 
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 Teams consolidated these comments into reports and passed these reports along to research 
organizations and the J7 Joint Service Development, which assesses the effectiveness of present 
and future operations.  These teams also inserted their lessons into the Joint Lessons Learned 74
Information System in order to make lessons available for any team or individual who wished to 
view them. 
In addition to formal learning, informal processes were also at work in the wake of OUA. 
Unstructured and often undocumented, informal processes are difficult to identify. Nonetheless, 
personal accounts can provide an indication of whether or not the process was at work. One 
indicator of informal learning processes is the way events are discussed in retrospect. One 
indicator of such learning is discussion amongst professional and social networks about the 
successes and failures of the event. Admiral Fargo noted that after OUA, he, as the PACOM 
Commander, was “constantly talking to different groups, both foreign and domestic” about 
OUA. More interesting, he noted that debriefing OUA was the “principal subject of discussion 
for the first quarter of 2005,” edging out North Korea, China, and any emerging situations in the 
Asia Pacific. Experiences were also shared through military journals and newspapers, 
discussions at war colleges, and discussions among combatant commanders and POTUS.   75
Last, there were indicators of a learning ethos around the time of this Operation. Like 
informal learning, a learning ethos is difficult to identify. However, one indicator of such an 
ethos is the way individuals view and discuss their experiences. ​Colonel Sevier, Admiral Fargo, 
and Lieutenant General Glueck all described OUA as a “learning experience” that prepared them 
for future operations. Likewise, in recognition that their operational experiences had value, the 
74Joint Chief of Staffs, 2017 <http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7%7CJointForceDevelopment.aspx> 
75 Thomas​ ​Fargo. (2017, April). Email followup to telephone interview.  
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 team at PACOM requested and received a military historian. This person collected experiences 
and observations throughout the operation. Furthermore, the fact that non-mandatory informal 
and formal learning processes were conducted to completion suggests the presence of a learning 
ethos.  
Given the presence and potency of these variables in the wake of OUA, does the amount 
and type of learning fall within institutionalization theory? The answer, I argue, is yes. Earlier, 
we discussed that the learning generated from OUA was reflective, primarily consisting of 
simple fixes, and that it surpassed baseline expectations for learning. The next chapter details 
how informal learning processes and a learning ethos worked synergistically to induce changes 
in practice for a subsequent mission, Operation Tomodachi. Given the presence and interaction 
of all these variables -- the institutionalized learning mechanisms themselves, the formal 
processes, and the learning ethos -- it is reasonable to conclude that institutional mechanisms 
drove the military to surpass our baseline for learning in HA/DR.  
 
Indeed, ​despite the informal learning processes at work, there is a dearth of observable, 
measurable products from this informal learning after this disaster and before Operation 
Tomodachi, the next major Asia Pacific HA/DR Operation. This is because the results of these 
informal learning processes are either largely unobservable, or observable primarily in future 
practice and as the enhanced inputs of future learning mechanisms. So, while we see the 
undercurrents of informal learning beginning to take shape, we do not yet see the results of it in 
the time period between OUA and Tomodachi. ​The next chapter advances this case for 
56 
 institutionalization theory by examining how the informal learning processes begun after OUA 























 Chapter IV  
Actions Speak Louder than Words: Changes in Practice in Operation Tomodachi  
 
“What a disaster relief operation really comes down to is not so much how good your doctrine is, 
not how well you train, but how you ​actually​ respond” 
-Colonel (ret.) Craig Kozeniesky, Commander of Task Force Fuji, Operation Tomodachi  
 
Introduction 
The last chapter measured learning during Operation Unified Assistance. It demonstrated 
that learning, as measured by doctrinal and institutional changes, surpassed our baseline 
expectations. After evaluating theories for military learning, I postulated that institutionalization 
theory offers the most complete explanation for this learning. In part, this chapter seeks to 
continue the analysis begun in OUA by examining how these changes were implemented in 
Operation Tomodachi. In doing so, it furthers develops institutionalization theory as an 
explanation for military learning.  
 
The Disaster and Operation Tomodachi 
Six years after and 3,000 miles away from the Indian Ocean Tsunami, disaster struck in 
Japan. On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake shattered the coast of an island east of 
mainland Japan. Next, the earthquake triggered a massive tsunami, creating seven monstrous 
waves over the next few hours. Fukushima nuclear power plant (about 170 miles north of Tokyo) 
was damaged in the tsunami, and a couple of its nuclear reactors exploded, causing a radiological 
emergency. This Triple Disaster--earthquake, tsunami, nuclear explosion-- was devastating for 
Japan and the surrounding area. 
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 More than any other nation in the world, Japan had taken extensive measures to prepare 
for earthquakes and tsunamis prior to the disaster in 2011. The nation invested in strong and 
resilient infrastructure, installed early warning systems, implemented and enforced strict building 
codes, installed seawalls, and established extensive communications plans to manage the chaos 
of a natural disaster.  Much of this investment paid off in 2011 when early warning systems and 76
earthquake-resistant infrastructure saved countless Japanese lives. Ultimately, however, almost 
20,000 people were killed by the tsunami.  The crisis worsened exponentially. By March 17th 77
over 500,000 people were displaced, millions were left without access to clean water, and many 
were at risk for radiation exposure because of the Fukushima power plant meltdown.  
Moments before the eruption of this chaos, the Japanese and American foreign ministries 
happened to be convened in the heart of Tokyo, discussing a recent Wikileaks release of 
confidential Japanese-US conversations.  Within hours of the earthquake, the Japanese had 7879
given the U.S. permission to initiate a whole of government disaster response. The military’s role 
in this response was titled Operation Tomodachi (meaning “friend” in Japanese).  
Like OUA, Tomodachi also fell under PACOM’s command. PACOM assigned U.S. 
Forces Japan to lead the operation due to USFJ’s proximity to the most affected area (Tokyo). 
Assigned to USFJ for support were the 7th Fleet, Fifth Air Force, U.S. Army Forces Japan, and 
Marine Forces Japan. In total, the military mobilized over 18,000 service members, 19 ships, and 
76 ​Daniel Kaufmann​ and Veronika Penciakova, “Japan’s Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, Tsunami 
and Nuclear Crises, “ ​Brookings Institution​, 16 March 2011.  
77 Elizabeth Ferris and Mireya Solís, “Earthquake, Tsunami, Meltdown – The Triple Disaster’s Impact on Japan, 
Impact on the World,” ​Brookings Institution,​ 11 March 2013.  
78 James Zumwalt, (2017, March), Telephone Interview.  
79 John Vidal, “WikiLeaks: Secret whaling deal plotted by US and Japan,” ​The Guardian,​ 6 January 2011.  
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 140 aircraft.  As written, the mission of Operation Tomodachi was to “coordinate with the 80
Government of Japan to determine required support to save lives, reduce human suffering, and/or 
mitigate great property damage within Japan.”   81
The Joint Task Force in Tokyo was soon established. American soldiers, sailors, and 
civilian disaster relief experts descended upon Tokyo, assisting local NGOs and Japanese civil 
society with relief efforts. Highlights of relief efforts include the rehabilitation of Sendai 
International Airport, which increased other organizations’ ability to mobilize and provide relief, 
massive search and rescue operations, logistics support and port clearance operations on Oshima 
Island, the cleanup and rebuilding of schools, and the cleanup of Nobiru Train Station.  The 82
mission’s execution officially began on March 12th (one day after the Triple Disaster) and ended 
on April 8th.  
Operation Tomodachi is generally considered a great success. Its exceptionally quick 
response saved lives and prevented the situation from deteriorating further. The first relief 
supplies were delivered within hours of disseminating the operation order, and within about two 
weeks, PACAF had conducted 444 sorties, carrying close to 6 million pounds of cargo for the 
operation.  3rd MEB reported that “transportation resources were rapidly tasked” and “Marine 83
Corps and Air Force airlift assets were employed within 24 hours notice to meet requirements.”  84
80 Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., “Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” RAND Corporation, 2013; NPR Staff and Wires,“​Japan Reports Progress In Stabilizing Nuclear Plant,​” 
National Public Radio News, 20 March 2011. 
81 USMC Support of Joint Support Force Japan (JTF 519), After Action Report 
82 ​Shuichi Wada, ​“​Japan Chair Platform: Operation Tomodachi in Miyagi Prefecture: Success and Homework,” 
CSIS​,  21 December 2011  
83 ​Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., “Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” RAND Corporation, 2013.  
84 3rd Marine Division After Action Report Tomodachi, 24  
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 The speed with which the military reacted was due in large part to the fact that so many U.S. 
troops are already stationed in Japan as part of U.S. Forces Japan.  
The proximity of U.S. Forces Japan had two key effects on the operation. First, 
logistically, it is faster to travel several hundred miles than several thousand, and it is simpler to 
deploy troops from the same command than it is to pull troops from a number of different areas 
all over the AOR. Second, the proximity of USFJ to the disaster meant that the American 
military had been training and working with the Japanese for some time. These pre-established 
relationships were invaluable amidst the chaos of the disaster response. A RAND report notes 
that years of “bilateral training, exercises, and planning” between Japanese and American forces 
had a sizeable positive impact on the execution of the response.   85
The overall success of the operation is reflected in the local population’s reception of it. 
According to a Yomiuri-Gallup opinion survey, although the majority were still weary of the 
strong U.S. troop presence in Okinawa after the disaster response, 94% of Japanese respondents 
appreciated Operation Tomodachi.  And one RAND study noted that the US favorability rating 86
in Japan surged from 66 percent to 85 percent in the two weeks after the earthquake.  The 87
operation also reflected well on the American military from the perspective of Japanese officials, 
generally. Top American officials reported that their relationships with Japanese counterparts 
were significantly improved because of the operation. In an AAR, BGen Craig Timberlake, 
commander of 3rd MEB noted “[Operation Tomodachi] has cemented our relationship...with the 
Japanese. It’s helped to change the political scene here, the political environment.”  These 88
85 ​Shuichi Wada, ​CSIS​, ​21 December 2011 
86 ​Ibid.  
87 ​Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., “Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” RAND Corporation, 2013.  
88USMC Support of Joint Support Force Japan (JTF 519), After Action Report, 23 
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 improved relationships and public perception of the American military underscore the 
effectiveness of the effort.  
 
Lessons Learned: How Lessons from OUA were Implemented-- “Learned” for Tomodachi 
 
In this section, I will highlight how the execution of Operation Tomodachi improved 
upon problems experienced in OUA. Then, I will analyze why these changes occurred. I contend 
that the most reasonable explanation for this practical learning lies in a combination of formal 
learning and informal learning processes.  
 
Practicing Lessons Learned  
Recall that in OUA, the key shortcomings centered around command and control (C2), 
distribution, and civil-military coordination and communication. C2 was largely unchanged in 
Tomodachi, for reasons I will explain later in this chapter. Distribution was conducted in a 
manner dramatically different than in OUA because of the capabilities and partnership with the 
Japanese Armed Forces. So, in this section I focus on discussing improvements in civil-military 
coordination. Recall that in OUA, there were a number of deficiencies in civil-military 
collaboration, including ambiguities in C2 relationships and roles; speed and efficacy of 
communication, exacerbated by a scarcity of liaison officers; and less-than-accurate assessments 
and planning processes because civilian actors were either not utilized or excluded from these 
processes. Furthermore, civil-military authorities lacked basic familiarity with one another. Each 
of these deficiencies was improved upon in Operation Tomodachi. 
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 First, command teams were integrated from conception, demonstrating attention to 
interagency collaboration at all levels of command. At the highest levels, key leaders developed 
a bilateral assistance coordination cell that included all U.S. government agencies and met daily. 
One level down, Commanding General of 3rd MEF and the Commander of JTF-505, Lt.Gen 
Glueck, decided to locate the USFJ headquarters at Yokota. It was a useful location because of 
its proximity to both the military and civilian command teams. He said in an AAR, “within 5 
minutes, we could be in the center of the JTF-519 headquarters, engaged with the leadership of 
Operation Tomodachi.”  And even within the command reporting to Lt.Gen. Glueck’s 89
command, the operational planning process included actors from various disaster response 
groups. For example, Colonel Kozeniesky of the Combined Arms Training Center Camp Fuji 
organized an interagency command team, ‘Task Force Fuji’, comprised of over 160 military and 
over 100 U.S. and Japanese civilian personnel.  Additionally, daily planning meetings included 90
actors from all organizations-- the Japanese military, interpreters, “folks in the embassy”, civil 
authorities and NGOs (which were mostly coordinated through the Japanese armed forces).  91
From the top all the way down, collaboration and information sharing was implemented.  
 
Second, where there were not completely integrated teams, the military incorporated 
representatives from other organizations into its planning efforts or send representatives to other 
organizations’ planning. For example, the military positioned a number of its personnel at the 
embassy in Tokyo, in addition to those who were already working there on a daily basis (e.g. 
foreign area officers). These liaison officers (LNOs), according to Admiral Scott Van Buskirk, 
89 ​Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 12  
91 Craig Kozeniesky, (2017, March), Telephone Interview.  
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 Commander of the 7th fleet, were “critical” in the planning process and “part of the drum beat” 
of the operation.  State Department representatives were placed into a number of operational 92
planning teams, as were USAID officials and Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams. These 
teams worked primarily as a liaison team between the American military and Japanese military, 
who worked directly with the local populace.  Additionally, even where teams were not 93
integrated nor where representatives not exchanged, key leaders made sure to hold frequent 
meetings to sync on planning issues.   94
 
Third, on a more personal level, both military and civilian personnel were more familiar 
with one another in Tomodachi than they were in OUA. Recall from OUA Colonel Sevier’s 
account of OUA; even he, being an officer as high up the chain of command as a C-130 
commander, had little to no exposure to USAID, the State Department, and NGOs before the 
operation.  By Tomodachi, this had changed. Based on AARs and interviews with personnel, 95
almost everyone involved had had ​at​ ​least​ a general familiarity with other disaster relief actors. 
 
Analysis of Learning 
Why did practices in civil-military coordination improve from Operation Unified 
Assistance to Operation Tomodachi? Of course, because the execution of any operation is 
subject to a number of moving pieces, there are a number of reasons that these practices might 
have improved from OUA to Tomodachi-- stronger leadership, a smaller national crisis versus a 
92 Scott Van Buskirk, (2017 April), Telephone Interview  
93 ​ USMC Support of Joint Support Force Japan (JTF 519), After Action Report, 24 
94 James Zumwalt, (2017, March), Telephone Interview  
95 Douglas Sevier, (2017 January), Personal Interview 
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 transnational crisis, or a better relationship with the host nation, to name a few. Nonetheless, we 
can make some informed suppositions about the forces driving this practical change.  
 
First and most simply, the doctrinal and institutional changes that were made after 
Operation Unified Assistance were put into practice carried over into the actual practice of the 
next major response-- Operation Tomodachi. The last section identified key areas where the 
military implemented the doctrinal and institutional changes it made after OUA into 
Tomodachi--the employment of more liaisons; a shared and unclassified communication 
platform; and the need to include civilian counterparts in the assessments and mission planning 
process, to name a few. By actually practicing doctrinal and institutional lessons learned from 
OUA, the military completed the learning process through to Operation Tomodachi. This is 
remarkable because based on our baseline expectations for learning, lessons learned from OUA 
should have resulted only in observed lessons, not full doctrinal and institutional lessons, let 
alone carried over into actual changes in practice.  
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that civil-military coordination benefited 
considerably from experiences gained in other operations -- ‘spillover’ learning. The majority of 
personnel with whom I spoke cited the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a key ‘learning 
experience’ that taught them best practices for civil-military coordination, not just in combat 
zones, but also in HA/DR situations. As Colonel Kozeniesky, commander of Task Force Fuji 
recalls,  
“In Iraq I worked with USAID quite a bit. In 2006, I was in Anbar Province, Ramadi as 
part of the Anbar Awakening and Bush surge. So, we went from pretty intense fighting to 
working on what was pretty much an emergency/humanitarian disaster response. 
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 Basically, a huge disaster exacerbated by war. We learned a lot from doing that, a lot 
about reconstructing a city, helping the local population.”  96
 
Indeed, at the time disaster struck in Japan, the U.S. had been fighting the war in Iraq for 
nearly eight years, and in Afghanistan for over nine years. Thus, the officers who had reached 
the operational planning level of command at the time of Tomodachi had cut their teeth on those 
wars; they had ‘grown up’ operating in an interorganizational environment.  
Third, military personnel also cited previous HA/DR experiences as a key factor in 
teaching them best practices for civil-military coordination in HA/DR. By the time the triple 
disaster in Japan rolled around, the military simply had more experience conducting disaster 
relief operations. 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit in particularly was considered the ‘handyman’ 
of disaster relief.  Col. Koziensky noted how his increased exposure to HA/DR operations 97
informed how he responded to Tomodachi. He said that he knew from his, “experience in the 
Philippines that the longer you wait, the chances of survival diminish significantly.”  He 98
elaborated that his past experience responding to the 2006 Mudslide in the Philippines taught 
him that the first 48 hour period is critical in finding survivors, prompting him to act 
aggressively with DoD in DC to get his Task Force’s plan, or concept of operations, approved so 
they could move out. Within days, his team was on the ground in large part due to Col. 
Koziensky’s prior experience. 
A number of personnel, like Col. Koziensky, emphasize past involvement as the key to 
knowing how to plan and execute a successful HA/DR operation. In AARs from Tomodachi, 
personnel noted their backgrounds and the experience of other military personnel with HA/DR as 
96 Craig Kozeniesky, (2017, March), Telephone Interview.  
97 ​Ibid​.  
98 ​Ibid​.  
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 influential. They say they looked to past AARs, employed professional and social networks to 
learn from others’ experiences, and looked to their own previous exposure in order to prepare for 
Operation Tomodachi. As the USMC AAR to Operation Tomodachi notes, “aviation and 
logistics Marines all noted that previous operations have resulted in an experience base of those 
who are familiar with planning and execution of HA/DR.”  The AAR goes on to quote a liaison 99
officer on the JTF-519 team, Captain Nelson, who noted,  
“Read the after action reports...out here [a disaster] happens every year during typhoon 
season, so there is always somebody here who has operated in an HA/DR environment before, 
who understands those unique considerations of dealing with other [actors]...,” and likewise, 
“This [Operation Tomodachi] is probably going to make us a little better prepared for when [a 
disaster] happens again.”  100
 
In sum, many aspects of Operation Tomodachi execution went better than did that of 
OUA because doctrinal changes were followed through on; personnel gained experience working 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and then applied that experience to HA/DR; and personnel shared 
experiences among one another and gained experience in HA/DR for themselves. In the next 
section, we will connect this finding once again to our theories of military learning.  
 
Further Analysis of Learning from OUA 
In the last chapter, we evaluated the explanatory power of other theories of military 
learning in Operation Unified Assistance. Deducing that realist, bureaucratic, and culturalist 
explanations alike are unsatisfying in explaining learning from OUA, I postulated that 
institutionalization theory offers a more compelling explanation for learning. Here, I will 
99 USMC AAR, Operation Tomodachi, 31  
100 ​Captain Christopher Nelson, Aviation Liaison Officer to JTF-519 and Operations Officer, Marine Air Support 
Squadron 2 in USMC AAR, Operation Tomodachi, 31  
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 continue that analysis by discussing the ways in which these changes in practice advance the 
case for institutionalization theory.  
For one thing, these practical changes indicate the completed learning cycle of a formal 
learning process. This is unexpected given our expectations for how the military should learn in 
disaster relief: learning should be doubly incomplete in that lessons should be observed, but not 
indoctrinated or institutionalized, and these lessons should not effectuate changes in practice. In 
fact, we see that the military far surpasses these expectations by creating doctrinal, institutional, 
and practical change.  
On a similar note, we see that an informal learning process was at word and is linked to 
changes in practice. Captain Nelson’s note that “there is always somebody here who has 
operated in an HA/DR environment before” implies that personnel seek out individuals with 
experience, seeking to develop an experience network from which lessons can be shared and 
learned. Indeed, what is telling about Captain Nelson’s note is not so much that he had 
experienced HA/DR in the past, but that he viewed that experience as consequential in the 
execution of further operations.  Further, Captain Nelson’s statement that Operation Tomodachi 
is likely to “better prepare” his team for future HA/DR operations is indicative of a culture that 
seeks to gather and retain lessons as much as possible, no matter the type of operation. This 
sentiment is echoed in the recognition of Colonel Kozeniesky and others, who noted the 
significance of their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as ‘learning experiences’ for both 
working with civilian agencies and working on humanitarian operations. Such recognition and 
reverence for experience points to an underlying organizational culture that seeks to incorporate 
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 experience into lessons learned and seeks to apply experience to a multitude of different 
contexts. 
Ultimately, the execution of Tomodachi, as detailed in the events themselves, AARs, and 
personal accounts, continues our analysis from the last chapter and reinforces our inclination that 
institutionalization theory, rather than others, offers the most compelling explanation for learning 
in HA/DR.  
 
Shortcomings and Learning from Operation Tomodachi 
 
Despite the many lessons that were learned from OUA to the Triple Disaster, the military 
nonetheless experienced a number of shortcomings in Tomodachi. I argue that these 
shortcomings emerged primarily because the military entered the operation with the same 
reactionary HA/DR posturing that was seen in OUA.  
In many ways, a disaster of this scale happening in Japan was unforeseeable. Ironically, 
because Japan expects natural disasters and has thus prepared for them more than any other 
nation, there was no expectation that Japan would need significant humanitarian assistance from 
the U.S. Further, the event of  a triple disaster in Japan -- a 9.0 moment magnitude earthquake, 
follow by an unusually overwhelming tsunami, and a radiological disaster-- was remarkable and 
unexpected by almost all actors. That said, it is surprising that the U.S. had no plan for a natural 
disaster in a nation that is home to 50,000 troops and military families. From this lack of 
preparation emerged a number of problems that could have been been anticipated and prevented 
through proper planning, despite the unexpected destruction of the disaster. Three shortcomings 
in particular stand out.  
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In the first place, the military failed to prepare for a set assessment standards for a nuclear 
disaster. One major shortcoming was the failure to properly prepare for operating in a chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment. The military had not set standards for 
emergency assessment, nor evacuation despite stationing over 50,000 personnel in Japan, and 
CBRN capabilities were not well known nor understood.  This lack of preparation led to the 101
evacuation of all American personnel within 50 miles, which, according to Ambassador Zumwalt 
was a major mistake.  Not only was the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “irate” for reasons to 102
do with protocol, but also the evacuation of so many American personnel at once alarmed the 
local populace, in turn heightening tensions between Japanese and American officials.   103
 
Second, there were key problems around C2 throughout the operation, but for reasons 
different than what we saw in OUA. In OUA, most C2 problems centered around civil-military 
coordination and syncing lines of efforts. Yet in Tomodachi, most C2 problems had to do with 
the command team itself and the speed with which it was able to respond. PACOM designated 
USFJ HQ the central command authority, which led to a host of legal and operational 
complexities and confusion because of USFJ’s organizational purpose; USFJ does not deploy, 
nor plan operations, but rather its responsibilities include maintaining port facilities and 
“providing base and logistic support across Japan.”  As General Glueck put it, “USFJ is a 104
101 Operation Tomodachi, Pacific Command General PPT, JLLS.  
102 ​James Zumwalt. (2017, March). Telephone Interview.  
103 ​Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., “Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” RAND Corporation, 2013; James Zumwalt (2017, March), Telephone Interview. 
104 Center for Excellence, “Civil-Military Lessons Learned in the Response to the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake,” ​The Liaison​ (Volume V 2012), 56-57.  
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 political-military headquarters; they are not focused on [operations]...they are focused on 
political stuff, [so] they had no idea how to do a response.”  USFJ was not staffed nor 105
configured to support operational-level C2, and which slowed the initial.  It is worth noting 106
also that additional C2 problems centered around working with a host nation with as many 
military capabilities as the Japanese Forces; American forces were not prepared to take a ‘back 
seat’ to efforts coordinated by the host nation.  107
 
Finally, a number of other deficiencies in Tomodachi planning and execution have to do 
with one major deficiency: the military had not planned for a disaster relief operation in a nation 
as wealthy, developed, and stable as Japan. Before Japan, the majority of HA/DR operations had 
been conducted in nations with suboptimal infrastructure, underdeveloped private industry, and 
weak militaries. The 3rd Marines Expeditionary Brigade AAR puts it best, “Don’t assume every 
nation will implode in a disaster.”  This led the military to miss, or nearly miss, opportunities to 108
provide relief in ways it had not anticipated. For example, when the Japanese requested water, 
the military’s knee jerk reaction was to send millions of bottled waters; fortunately, planners on 
the civilian side of things suggested reaching out to the large Coca-Cola factory in Japan to 
provide water, saving American taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars in logistics.   109
Each of these details point to a shortcoming in the learning that we saw from OUA before 
Tomodachi. While the military incorporated simple fixes and improved its practice of HA/DR, it 
did not undergo any broad structural changes or paradigm shifts in the way it conducts HA/DR. 
105 Ken Glueck (2017, March), Telephone Interview.  
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 “After Action Report for Operation Tomodachi...,” 3rd Marine Expeditionary Division, 6 May 2011.  
109 James Zumwalt, (2017 March), Telephone Interview.  
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 At the time of Operation Tomodachi, the military still viewed HA/DR as largely reactionary 
operations that could not be planned for. The next section describes how this changed after 























Chapter V:  
Post Tomodachi Reposturing? 
 
“You can’t fully prepare for those things [major disasters], but you ​can​ get in front of 
them--get left of the boom-- through exercises and proper planning”  
-Lieutenant General Ken Glueck, 3rd Marine Forces Commander, Operation Tomodachi  
 
This chapter tests our theories for military learning by identifying and analyzing the 
learning that emerged from Operation Tomodachi. This chapter argues that military learning 
occurred despite the absence of traditional incentives to learn, and that institutionalization theory 
best explains this learning. In order to support this argument, this chapter describes and analyzes 
the learning that took place in the wake of Operation Tomodachi. I argue that the the military 
learned more than expected in Tomodachi and that the type of learning that emerged was 
substantively more proactive than we would expect. This chapter ends by once again evaluating 
the explanatory power of each theory of military learning, concluding that institutionalization 
theory best explains the military’s pattern of learning post-Tomodachi. 
 
Products of Learning  
After Operation Tomodachi, we see a number of institutional and doctrinal changes that 
correspond directly to problems experienced in the disaster response. Additionally, however, we 
see additional trends in learning emerge. First, there appears to be more of it, with more 
DoD-sponsored publications and reports on HA/DR produced after Tomodachi than after OUA. 
Second, the military appears to have undergone a paradigm shift in the way that it views HA/DR 
operations, shifting its perspective of HA/DR from largely reactionary to anticipatory. In this 
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 section, I will first unpack each of these changes, analyze the mechanisms behind the change, 
and return to our theories in order to evaluate why this learning took place after Operation 
Tomodachi.  
Like after OUA, the learning products that emerged after Operation Tomodachi directly 
corresponded to problems encountered during the mission. I have labeled these learning products 
‘simple fixes’. Indeed, the military updated doctrine in order to address problems related to 
nuclear crisis, producing Joint Publication 3-11 Operations in Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.  Recall that in Tomodachi, the military had not set 110
standards for assessment or evaluation of a nuclear emergency. Additionally, there was a basic 
unfamiliarity with procedure. This new version of JP 3-11 “defines four new levels of CBRN 
hazard identification” and outlines procedures, as well as providing recommendations, for new 
ways of training CBRN.  The military also noted ways to prepare for such risks in doctrine 111
published in the wake of the Triple Disaster, such as the DoD’s guidebook for JTF commanders 
in disaster relief operations.  112
Another example of a ‘simple fix’ is the establishment a new SOP designating that 
forward deployed forces should take the lead in HA/DR operations from the beginning. Director 
of CFE Joseph Martin noted that around this time, it became a known SOP that 3rd MEB would 
lead these operations, saying, “they’re ready to go. They’re going to go.”  The military then 113
updated its doctrine on SOPs for operating in a multinational structure, completed a final version 
110 ​Originally published in 2008, the military updated this doctrine in 2012 in the immediate aftermath of the Triple 
Disaster.  
111 “JP 3-11: Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments,” Joint Staff, 2008.  
112 “Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for JTF Commanders”, 13 July 2011.  
113 Joseph Martin, (2017 January), Personal Interview.  
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 of its updates in October 2013, as well as its SOPS regarding the choosing the commanding 
force.   114
This time, however, the military did not merely undergo ‘simple fixes’ in the wake of a 
crisis event. After Tomodachi, we see a different, more structural kind of learning taking shape 
in a number of ways. The military re-organized CFE from a globally-oriented organization to 
one focused solely on the PACOM area of responsibility.  CFE developed a closer relationship 115
to PACOM and the organization became more symbiotic.  116
This focus on the PACOM-area of responsibility is reflected in CFE’s publications and 
increased research. In the wake of Tomodachi, the Center for Excellence began producing 
Disaster Management Reference Handbooks, guides that are intended “to provide decision 
makers, planners, responders and disaster management practitioners with an overview of the 
disaster management structure, policies, laws, and plans” for a particular host nation. These 
guides provide the military with information on population numbers, hot spots for weak 
infrastructure, and the local government’s national disaster relief structure. Overall, the guides 
aim to expedite the response process in areas that have, in the past, hindered the speed and 
efficacy of HA/DR response.  
Additionally, the Center for Excellence began producing its ​Liaison​ journal, which 
details lessons learned and best practices for disaster relief after almost every major or medium 
disaster response.  Joseph Martin, the current Director of CFE, called these publications both 117
“anticipatory and reactionary” because after a disaster, they immediately incorporate lessons 
114 Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Secretariat, “MNFSOP,” PACOM HQ, December 2014.  
115 Stephanie Pazard et al., “The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management: an assessment of roles and 
missions,” RAND Corporation, 2016.  
116 ​ Joseph Martin, (2017 January), Personal Interview.  
117 Center for Excellence, Liaison Archives, <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Publications/Liaison/Liaison-Archives>  
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 learned into new publications. However, the publications are also ‘anticipatory’ in that they seek 
to predict and assess the risks of upcoming disasters. Martin and many others at the CFE noted 
that, based on research, they anticipated an upcoming crisis in Bangladesh and had advised 
PACOM to be on standby for it.  118
The military also began taking preventive measures like working to increase host nation 
capabilities and developing early detection disaster response mechanisms.  A number of 119
officials cited these capacity building efforts as evidence that the military was developing 
tentative plans for future disaster relief operations. Lieutenant General Ken Glueck, who 
participated in OUA, Tomodachi, and numerous other responses while commanding the Joint 
Task Force in Operation Tomodachi, noted this prepositioning in the runup to Nepal.  120
Glueck said that after Tomodachi, his team embarked on a training exercise in Nepal. 
This exercise united military and civilian planners, including USAID,Nepal’s military, the 
Embassy, and independent experts.  They convened for ten days, walking the streets 121
Kathmandu and wargaming crisis scenarios in Nepal. This ten day conference culminated in the 
production of a tentative concept of operations for a disaster in Nepal, which Glueck estimates 
could shave 4-5 days off the response time for an operation in Nepal.  Glueck said that, sure 122
enough, when disaster struck Nepal in 2015, General Wissler had a concept of operations to 
assist him in planning. In this way, the military got, as Glueck said, “as far left of the boom” as 
118 CFE personnel (2017, January). Personal interviews. It is worth noting that CFE is not the only organization to 
publish more reports on disaster relief in the wake of Tomodachi. The DoD also funded comprehensive external 
assessments from RAND, in addition to conducting a number of internal assessments.  
119 PACOM officials, (2017, January), Personal Interviews.  
120 Ken Glueck, (2017, March), Telephone Interview. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.  
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 they possibly could given the moving pieces of a crisis scenario.  A number of officials at 123
PACOM and CFE alike echoed Glueck’s thoughts when discussing the Philippines. They 
highlighted the military’s rather light response to the 2014 flooding as evidence that the 
military’s train and assist and capacity building partnership with the military in the Philippines 
worked. The American military did not need to respond with full might because it had already 
helped to develop the Philippine’s ability to respond independently.  124
 
Analysis of Learning 
This section seeks to evaluate the explanatory power of each learning theory based on the 
character and amount the learning observed from Operation Tomodachi. From the information 
above, it is clear that the military continued to implement small fixes while also undergoing what 
appears to be a paradigm shift in the way it views disaster relief operations. What explains this 
learning? Why did it happen at all, and why did it happen in the way that it did?  
Again, our realist, bureaucratic, and culturalist theories inform potential hypotheses for 
military learning in Tomodachi. These theories must address two different questions. First, 
according to each theory, were the conditions that catalyze learning present during Tomodachi? 
And second, do the content, rate, and nature of the learning match the predictions of that theory? 
First, we will examine bureaucratic theory. According to this theory, the conditions for 
learning were not present during and after Tomodachi. Bureaucrats might argue that Obama’s 
‘pivot to Asia’ resulted in an increase in funding to PACOM and disaster relief operations alike. 
However, we do not see a dramatic increase in PACOM’s budget for disaster relief. In fact, CFE, 
123 Ibid.  
124 ​PACOM and CFE officials, (2017, January), Personal Interviews.  
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 the military’s primary source for disaster relief training and research, had its funding cut 
significantly. The current director of CFE, Joseph Martin concluded that CFE had “70 enduring 
and 21 implied tasks, and a total of 158 specific required activities”, but of those 158 activities, 
“only 44, or 28 percent, were fully resourced, while 74 activities were partially resourced and 40 
lacked any support.”  Moreover, General Glueck reported skepticism that the pivot to Asia 125
brought a significant increase resourcing to the military’s area of responsibility at all, let alone 
for the secondary task of disaster relief.   126
Furthermore, the character and rate of learning we observed after Tomodachi does not fit 
within the predictions of bureaucratic theorists. Recall that bureaucratic theories predict learning 
to increase in the wake of a remarkable event -- a disaster -- and that the content will largely 
consist of quick fixes. While we see a spike in learning after the crisis event Tomodachi, and we 
do, in fact, see a number of ‘quick fixes’, we also see the undercurrents of another type of 
learning. This other type of learning is broader, deeper, and more structurally focused than mere 
quick fixes. Thus, bureaucratic theories provide an unsatisfactory explanation for learning from 
Tomodachi.  
 
In addition, we will examine the culturalist theories. Culturalist theories are 
unsatisfactory in their explanations of learning from Tomodachi for largely the same reasons 
they were for OUA.  Some might argue that the leadership of General Glueck or that the 
Marines’ command and attention to disaster relief motivated learning, arguing that the Marines 
took on a ‘maverick’ role themselves in reforming disaster relief doctrine and posture. 
125 ​Pazard 
126 ​Ken Glueck, (2017, March), Telephone Interview. 
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 These theories, however, fail to explain both the character of the learning product and the 
nature of the learning process that we saw after Tomodachi. We did not only see a sharp spike in 
learning after Tomodachi but also the deliberate and simple incorporation of lessons learned into 
practices. Further, reform efforts were made by a number of different organizations within the 
military; from the Army’s Pacific Pathways emphasizing capabilities to 3rd MEF’s forward 
planning to PACOM and CFE’s increased attention to future operations, we did not see ‘a few 
good men’ working to upend the system, as much as an ecosystem of practiced learning.  
 
Third, we will examine realist theories. These theories provide a more compelling 
explanation for learning than do bureaucratic and culturalist theories, but nonetheless are 
incomplete. Realists might argue that Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ increased the attention on the 
PACOM area of responsibility, triggering an increase in learning. Obama was more attentative 
than past presidents, not only to the threat of a rising China and North Korea, but also climate 
change itself. Thus, realists might say that the U.S. has a strategic interest in maintaining stability 
in the region.  
While this ‘pivot to Asia’ explanation is reasonable, it is also incomplete. General Glueck 
noted that “the President’s shift to the Pacific was a lot of rhetoric” -- in that while the area may 
have seen an increase in overall resourcing, the “mindset” was still focused on the Middle East in 
the wake of Tomodachi. Iraq and Afghanistan was still the primary security interest for the U.S. 
at the time of the disaster; these wars, even after the pivot, were still extracting much of the 
manpower and capabilities from the PACOM components.  Further, if the U.S. was 127
127 ​Ken Glueck, (2017, March), Telephone Interview. 
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 strategically concerned with disaster relief, why cut funding to disaster relief training and 
research, as it did in the wake of Tomodachi? Given these snags, it is reasonable to conclude that 
realist explanations do not provide entirely satisfying explanations for learning.  
 
Given the shortcomings of realist, culturalist, and bureaucratic theories, and what we 
know about learning post-Tomodachi, it is reasonable to deduce that other mechanisms at work. 
Just as after OUA, the variables that other theories claim induce learning either were not potent 
enough or were not even present, and therefore could not have produced the amount of learning 
that we observed. However what ​was​ present, like after OUA, were institutionalized learning 
mechanisms, as well as formal and informal processes. 
By in large, the same institutionalized learning mechanisms that were present post-OUA 
were also present post-Tomodachi -- the indoctrinated AAR process, and online lessons learned 
databases, to name a couple. And again, just after OUA, the military underwent formal. Almost 
every service and line of effort conducted an AAR and produced a report, which they passed 
along to research organizations like RAND and to internal staff, e.g. J7 Joint Service 
Development, in order to be consolidated into institutional memory for future planning and 
operations.  These teams also inserted their lessons into the Joint Lessons Learned Information 128
System in order to make lessons available for any team or individual who wished to view them. 
Additionally, there are signs that a number of informal learning processes took place in 
the wake of Tomodachi, informing a change of posturing. First, after Operation Tomodachi, 
individuals like General Glueck who had experience with disaster relief became commonplace in 
128Joint Chief of Staffs, 2017 <http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7%7CJointForceDevelopment.aspx> 
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 leadership roles. The director of CFE, the commander of the J3 operations team at PACOM, and 
the commander of 3rd MEF alike had disaster relief experience before embarking on their roles. 
A number of personnel pointed to these leaders as critical resources in the planning and 
execution for disaster relief, not so much as an individual expert, but rather as a resource for 
experiential and institutional knowledge to be shared. In developing the current PACOM concept 
of operations, one member of the J3 staff Lieutenant Commander Schaeffer said that, “Most of 
the research for the revision of the concept of operations came from reviewing lessons learned 
from the PACOM staff and components.”   129
In describing his process for writing this current concept of operations he said,  “those 
that had the experience was vital and having all the products that were created during those 
events also helped to determine, in hindsight, where we could have made improvements,”. 
Schaeffer’s reference to informal conversations is suggests that individuals are employing 
networks of experience in order to improve their own understand and execution of disaster relief. 
Such attention to experience and learning is indicative of a learning ethos and informal learning 
mechanisms driving improvement.  
The table below summarizes the conditions and products of learning from Tomodachi. 















Partial  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
In sum, other theories of military learning did not provide satisfactory explanations for 
the character of the learning we see post-Tomodachi, the rate of learning, and the conditions 
129 Kevin Schaeffer (2017, January), Personal Interview.  
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 under which learning occurred. Thus, given that we see informal and formal learning processes 
at work, as well as institutionalized learning processes, it is reasonable to conclude that 
























 Chapter VI  
Further Implications of this Research 
 
Summary of Results  
This paper has shown: 1) despite low expectations for learning, the military learns in 
HA/DR operations; 2) the military exhibits improved learning over time in these operations; and 
3) where traditional explanations for military learning fall short, institutionalization theory 
provides a compelling explanation for why and how the military learned in these operations. This 
paper synthesizes bureaucratic and cultural explanations for learning to propose an alternative 
theory. This theory, which I call institutionalization, argues that the military’s institutionalized 
learning mechanisms and a learning ethos induce learning no matter the operational context. 
Thus, we see learning even in an operational context absent traditional incentives to learn. These 
findings have implications for future military operations and potential research, which will be 
discussed below.  
 
Implications for Future Disaster Relief Operations 
Every year, the United States conducts a dozen disaster relief operations. With global 
warming as a stimulus, the number of these operations is expected to increase. As policymakers 
continue to conduct disaster relief operations, they would do well to consider promoting the 
military’s role to one of primary leadership. The modern American military is multifunctional, 
and therefore, policymakers might be hesitant to assign the military another task. Yet, this thesis 
shows that even on limited resources and time, the military can perform increasingly well at 
disaster relief. This is not to say that other organizations should not lead aspects of the operation, 
but rather to emphasize that the military’s capacity to learn during HA/DR may warrant a larger 
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 role in planning and conducting these operations. The military’s non-HA/DR training and 
learning ethos have equipped it with the tools to conduct increasingly successful operations. The 
findings of this thesis suggest that the military’s learning mechanisms induce simple operational 
fixes, transfer lessons across operational contexts (i.e. ‘spillover learning’), and increase its rate 
of learning overtime. These mechanisms, then, lead to larger structural changes. 
After Operation Unified Assistance, the military exhibited several indicators of limited 
learning, including small scale doctrinal, institutional, and practical fixes. Additionally, in the 
time period between Operation Unified Assistance in 2004/2005 and Operation Tomodachi in 
2011, members of the military saw an increase in interorganizational operations. The lessons 
generated in Operation Unified Assistance were applied in Operation Tomodachi and in later 
operations. It was post-Tomodachi, though, when the military saw larger gains from simple fixes 
and spillover learning, but also larger structural changes in the way it conducts HA/DR. Instead 
of viewing these operations as largely reactionary, the military adopted a ‘capacity building’ 
model. In this model, the military aims to increase the resilience of nations, equip them with the 
tools necessary to react with less American assistance, and build relationships ahead of time with 
those actors in order to prepare for future HA/DR operations and cooperation on the ground. In 
multiple operations since its implementation, this model has performed well. While not the focus 
on this thesis, the 2013 response in the Philippines has been hailed as the paragon of HA/DR 
operations. The operation went smoothly, left the nation’s infrastructure better than it was before, 
and helped the nation build its own resilience so that when a similar disaster struck in 2014, the 
nation could respond on its own with little American assistance.  
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 Implications for the Military as a Learning Organization  
In an interesting twist, HA/DR operations provide an ideal context for the military’s 
military learning structure. First, the reflective nature of the military’s learning process lends 
itself to operations that are repeated over and over again, similar in content and character. The 
institutional learning mechanisms that the military has adopted, like the AAR, are primarily 
reflective. This means that ‘lessons’ or operational deficiencies must have ​already​ occurred 
before the military can fix them. As such, this system works best when follow-on operations are 
similar-- this way, the failures of past operations can be improved upon for future operations. 
The military’s role in HA/DR operations is largely consistent throughout different disasters. 
Even in contexts as different as Indonesia and Japan, the military's role was primarily one of 
logistical assistance and aid distribution. The military improved from one disaster to the next 
because the operations were remarkably similar in character. 
Second, the AAR process works best when conducted at the end of an operation, after the 
chaos has settled and actors can effectively reflect on their experiences. For an AAR, all actors 
discuss successes and failures and produce recommendations for future operations. Such a 
reflection is an impossible task when aspects of the operation are still underway. For example, 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing, long term operations. It is difficult to reflect upon 
them and to draw substantial lessons from them while the fog of war continues on. However, for 
HA/DR operations, there is a designated ‘start’ and ‘end’ point. The end point allows the military 
to stop, reflect upon what just happened, and improve itself for follow-on operations.  
This leads to another question: can the military export the HA/DR model to increase 
military learning in other operations? If so, under what circumstances might the HA/DR model 
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 of learning apply? Where might it fall short? As mentioned above, the HA/DR model of learning 
likely will do poorly in an ongoing-conflict setting. The wars in Iraq, and Afghanistan, for 
example, each lack a clear end date and involve an ever-evolving enemy. Due to the volatile, 
fluctuating nature of these conflicts, military personnel are unable to fix problems that are still 
occurring in real time. The operations of 2003 Iraq look dramatically different from those of 
2005 Iraq, whereas Operation Unified Assistance looks remarkably similar to Operation 
Tomodachi, Damayan, etc. For these reasons, we would expect less learning to emerge from 
these operations than HA/DR. However, HA/DR methodology can still be useful because there 
are operations, like HA/DR, that are repetitive and largely consistent, particularly at the tactical 
level. For example, conducting a night raid or launching a peacekeeping operation.  
On the other hand, could HA/DR be used to preview operational frameworks and 
strategies before they are implemented in combat zones? While exporting the HA/DR model of 
learning in other situations might be difficult, I propose that HA/DR nonetheless present a 
unique opportunity for military learning. HA/DR operations provide the military with a relatively 
safe, low-pressure environment that can function as a laboratory for new ideas. The military 
could use HA/DR operations to test new command structures, communication processes, and 
strategic initiatives. Due to the repetitive nature of HA/DR, the military will be able to evaluate 
and correct the deficiencies of these operations in an iterative process. These lessons will become 
an invaluable tool for the military as it engages nimble, adaptive enemies that will not wait for 
lessons to be learned. Lessons learned from such operations could yield substantive benefits for 
the military when they are transferred to riskier, violent operations.  
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 Further Puzzles and Call for Future Research 
This thesis focuses on operations conducted out of the PACOM combatant command. 
Nonetheless, I interviewed individuals who worked on operations out of Southern Command and 
Central Command. From these interviews and consequent research emerged new findings. 
Interviews with military personnel who worked on Operation Unified Response in Haiti in 2010 
indicate that the operation benefited little from PACOM’s previous lessons learned. This 
suggests that, at least under some conditions, learning does not transfer well across combatant 
commands, but rather is siloed and must be relearned. This is puzzling because, although a 
combatant command is stagnant, military personnel are not. Personnel from unit to unit and often 
transfer across combatant commands in order to foster combat readiness. This is the first puzzle: 
why and how, then, might lessons get lost?  
This thesis has evaluated the lessons learned from an operation rather than the objective 
success of it. However, interviews with individuals at different combatant commands suggest 
that some combatant commands lend themselves to better HA/DR operations than others. That 
is, some operational environments are more conducive to learning than others. One HA/DR 
operation that went particularly well was the American response to the 2010 Monsoon Flooding 
in Pakistan. Lieutenant General Nagata and Colonel (Ret.) Cosby both emphasized the 
operational benefits of having a pre-existing working relationship with the Pakistanis. U.S. Army 
Pakistan was able to leverage years of security cooperation and counter-Taliban operations to 
increase their the operating environment. By 2010, military personnel operating in Pakistan had 
strong relationships with Pakistani counterparts and an intimate knowledge of the civilian 
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 population, infrastructure, and geography. This knowledge is key to conducting HA/DR 
operations.  
The success of some operations over others raises a second puzzle-- under what 
conditions might HA/DR operations be best conducted? Most military personnel would agree 
that a violent operational context complicates peaceful operations. That is, it is more challenging 
to conduct HA/DR operations in countries with active violent conflicts. However, the Pakistan 
story suggests otherwise, that there might be substantial operational benefits to conducting 
operations other than war in a violent operational context.  
Therefore, I recommend that future researchers investigate these puzzles in order to 
refine our understanding of military learning. Knowing how and why lessons are learned and lost 
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List and Description of Interviewees  
MILITARY PERSONNEL  
 NAME ORGANIZATION ROLE  
1 Colonel(ret.) William Cosby U.S. Army Pakistan  J3 Planning Team, Foreign Area Officer 
2 Admiral Thomas Fargo PACOM Commander 
3 Lieutenant General Burton Field U.S. Forces Japan Commander 
4 Lieutenant General Ken Glueck 3rd Marines Expeditionary Force Commander 
5 Lieutenant General Ken Keen Southern Command Deputy Commander  
6 Lieutenant Colonel Rodney Legowski  3rd Marines Expeditionary 
Brigade 
Operational Planner 
7 Lieutenant Colonel Licina Tripler Medical Center Army Doctor (past, Office of Secretary 
of the Defense)  
8 Jason King PACOM Liaison from Canadian Armed Forces 
9 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Matelski  PACOM  Deployable Joint Force Augmentation 
Cell (J-35) 
10 Rear Admiral Mark C. Montgomery PACOM Director for Operations (J3) 
11 Lieutenant General Michael Nagata U.S. Army Pakistan Deputy Chief, Office of the Defense 
Representative to Pakistan (ODRP) 
12 Major John Nonnemaker PACOM Civil Affairs Outreach (J9) 
13 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Reilly PACOM  Operational Planner 
14 Colonel Douglas Sevier U.S. Air Force, Yokota Air Force 
Base  
Deputy Commander, 374th Operations 
Group, Airlift 
15 Lieutenant Commander Kevin Schaeffer PACOM Operations Officer (J3)  
16 Major General Steven Rudder PACOM Director for Strategic Planning and 
Policy (J5)  
17 Vice Admiral Scott Van Buskirk 7th Fleet Commander  
18 Lieutenant Colonel Chad Witherell PACOM Civil Affairs Division Chief (SOJ38) 
19 Major General Darryl Wong Hawaii National Guard The Adjutant General, Hawaii 
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  CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL  
 NAME ORGANIZATION ROLE 
20 Warren Acuncius  USAID/OFDA Disaster Response Planner  
21 Alan Aoki Center for Excellence (CFE) Research Analyst 
22 James Brown UNOCHA  Disaster Response, Humanitarian 
Advisor  
23 Mrko Crnovich USAID/DCHA/Office of 
Civil-Military Cooperation 
Deputy Director and Chief of Plans and 
Policy Division 
24 Ben Hemingway USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor, Thailand 
25 Joseph Martin  CFE (retired USAF) Director  
26 Veronika Martin  USAID/OFDA Analyst  
27 Trevor Monroe  CFE Assessment Analyst 
28 Dr. Alberto Morales CFE Executive Officer 
29 Ambassador Lauren Moriarty  U.S. Department of State  Ambassador to Asia Pacific Economic 
Council  
30 Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe U.S. Department of State Ambassador to Indonesia  
31 Lloyd Puckett  CFE  Analyst  
32 Robert Reyes CFE Civ-Mil & HADR Plans Officer, 
Mission Support Services  
33 Jim Ruf United States Institution of Peace Senior Program Officer  
34 Jesse Wolfe CFE (retired USMC)  Analyst  
35 Major General Darryll Wong  Hawaii National Guard Adjutant General  
36 Ambassador James Zumwalt U.S. Embassy Japan Deputy Chief of Mission 
  
 CIVILIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL  
 NAME ORGANIZATION ROLE 
37 Jared Batzel Pacific Disaster Association PACOM Liaison  
38 Christina Davis  Mission to the World Director of Global Disaster Response 
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 39 Brian Michelson  The Atlantic Council U.S. Army Fellow  
40 Lauren Rajczak Interaction Security Coordinator  
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